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Abstract 
The impact of stress on eyewitness recall and identification accuracy has been studied extensively but with somewhat 
inconsistent results. Understanding the effects of stress are important if they are to be generalized to victims or 
witnesses of real crimes. This study consisted of two experiments that used an extreme haunt and a haunted house 
to examine attendees’ ability to recall details of and identify actors encountered, as a function of state anxiety and in 
the context of Deffenbacher’s (1994) catastrophe model of memory performance under anxiety. The results showed 
that physiological (i.e., heart rate) and psychological (i.e., State Anxiety Inventory) measures of arousal were 
associated for extreme haunt attendees but not haunted house attendees. In contrast to previous research 
conducted by Valentine and Mesout (2009), the current research suggests that reported levels of stress can 
sometimes have minimal or no effect on eyewitness recall or identification accuracy. 
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 In the pursuit of a fair and effective criminal justice system, evidence has shown that wrongful convictions 
are not unusual (Norris et al., 2019). One reason is that eyewitnesses play a vital role in the criminal justice system. 
The impact that an eyewitness has on a jury verdict is significant and while their testimony can be characterized as 
powerful (Wise et al., 2009), such identifications can be inaccurate, possibly due to the impact of heightened stress 
on the fidelity of eyewitness memory (Deffenbacher et al., 2004). Studies of real eyewitness identifications have 
shown that nearly one-third of positive identifications are of foils known to be innocent (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 
2019). Of the more than 350 DNA exonerations of wrongfully convicted men and women, eyewitness 
misidentifications played a role in over 70% of these cases (Innocence Project, 2020). 
 The quality of crime-related memories is often influenced by an eyewitness’ emotional response to the 
event (Hervé et al., 2013). Most studies that examine eyewitness identification utilize staged events that are either 
live or filmed. One issue that these studies face is that real witnesses typically experience higher and richer levels of 
arousal that researchers are unable to create in the laboratory, due to ethical constraints (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 
2009). The level of stress experienced by college students in a laboratory setting is sharply different from the level 
of stress real-life witnesses or victims may experience – thus, it is vital to understand the effect stress may have on 
eyewitness recall and identification accuracy. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of stress on 
eyewitness recall and identification accuracy utilizing naturalistic-based methods (i.e., simulated assault, multiple 













II. The Problem with Eyewitness Testimony 
A Case of Mistaken Identity 
 During the early morning of August 11, 1979, a seventy-four-year-old woman in Manchester, Georgia, was 
burglarized and sexually assaulted. After the horrific crime had taken place, the victim stood in front of a live lineup 
at the Meriwether County police station. As the victim looked onward at five men standing side-by-side in front of 
her, she, without hesitation, picked out the man in the middle of the lineup. At that moment, the victim stated, 
“That's the man who came in my apartment, that's the man who raped me” (State v. White, 1980, p. 214), even 
though one week earlier,  she was said to have been “almost positive” (State v. White, 1980, p. 151) of her 
identification of the same individual when presented an eight-person photo array. At the trial, the victim confirmed 
that the man who had entered her apartment was in the courtroom. Indicating in front of the jury and the rest of 
the courtroom, she stated, “That’s him” (State v. White, 1980, p. 62). The identification of John Jerome White has 
led to one of the most well-known cases of eyewitness misidentification. 
 In her book, Eyewitness Testimony, Loftus (1979) wrote, “There is almost nothing more convincing than a 
live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says, ‘That’s the one!’” (p. 19). Shortly 
following the moment in which White was pointed to in court, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. It 
did not matter that, at the time of the assault, the victim was not in possession of her prescribed corrective lenses, 
or that the only light came from a little walk-in closet in a connecting room. What mattered to the jury was that 
White had been identified by the victim on three separate occasions, despite the incorrect use of a multiple 
identification procedure. 
 White was convicted on May 30, 1980, but was eventually exonerated and released from Macon State 
Prison on December 10, 2007, based on DNA evidence that showed that another individual had sexually assaulted 
the victim.1 The answer to how misidentification occurs is often explored through layers and complexities. To better 
understand how misidentifications can occur, this chapter will examine factors that can influence eyewitness recall 
 
1 While the identification from the photo array placed the focus on White, James Edward Parham had been in custody 
on an unrelated charge at the time and was used as a filler in the five-person live lineup (Benforado, 2015; Garrett, 
2011). What the victim and police never knew was that Parham, standing two spots to the right of White, was the 
individual whom they had been looking for all along (Benforado, 2015; Garrett, 2011). After the sentencing of White 
in 1980, Parham would go on to commit another rape six years later and eventually plead guilty to the crime for 
which White had been convicted (Garrett, 2011). 
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and identification accuracy, which can lead to wrongful convictions, ultimately showing notable problems with 
eyewitness testimony. 
Estimator and System Variables 
Estimator Variables 
 Estimator variables are aspects of the event itself (including attributes of the witness) that may influence the 
reliability of eyewitness memory, and that are beyond the control of the criminal justice system (Granhag et al., 2014; 
Wells, 1978). From the straightforward (e.g., lighting) to the psychologically complex (e.g., stress), estimator variables 
are comprised of both event-related and witness-related variables (Granhag et al., 2014). Event-related variables 
involve factors such as the presence of a weapon (Fawcett et al., 2013), witnesses’ ability to better recognize faces 
from their own race relative to other races (Brigham et al., 2007), the level of violence experienced (Clifford & 
Hollin, 1981), and the number of perpetrators (Fahsing et al., 2004). Witness-related variables involve factors such 
as alcohol or drug consumption (Hagsand et al., 2013; Janssen & Anne, 2019), age of the witness (Fitzgerald & Price, 
2015), intellectual disabilities (Maras & Bowler, 2014), and cognitive stress (Christianson, 1992; Deffenbacher et al., 
2004). Estimator variables are essential, and with guidance from applied memory research, such variables can 
properly assist jurors when evaluating the reliability of an eyewitness, allow prosecutors to evaluate the strength of 
a case properly, and in some instances, determine the admissibility of evidence (Lampinen et al., 2012). 
System Variables 
 A variable that comes into play following the occurrence of a witnessed event and initial encoding is known 
as a system variable (Wells, 1978). Unlike estimator variables, system variables are under the control of the criminal 
justice system and are commonly split into two categories: interviewing the eyewitness and instructing the witness 
to identify the suspect (Gronlund & Carlson, 2014). System variables are intended to assist the criminal justice system 
in the collection and evaluation of eyewitness evidence, and the ways in which these procedures are executed is of 
extreme importance. While an identification procedure (e.g., mug book, showup, lineup) or interview guideline (e.g., 
Cognitive Interview (CI; Geiselman et al., 1984)) is intended to enhance the accuracy of eyewitness evidence, the 
proper administration of both is crucial to ensure best practices that lower the risk of wrongful convictions. In the 
White case, the identification procedures and administration (i.e., the lineups — how they were constructed and 
presented) are a clear example of system variables. 
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 The influence of estimator and system variables on eyewitness reliability has received much attention 
throughout the last 40 years. In fact, if one were to pick up a textbook in the field of cognition (e.g., Radvansky & 
Ashcraft, 2014), one would come across the view that eyewitness memory can be unreliable. While there are 
individuals within the field of academic psychology who believe that eyewitness memory is unreliable, there are those 
who attribute such unreliability to actors in the criminal justice system and the administration of various procedures, 
rather than the eyewitness. Specifically, Wixted et al. (2018) shed light on the unreliability surrounding eyewitness 
memory, stating that, “Eyewitness memory has been wrongfully convicted of mistakes that are better construed as 
having been committed by other actors in the legal system” (p. 324). Despite the fact that some researchers feel as 
though eyewitness memory is reliable if uncontaminated and when near-“pristine” testing procedures are used, it is 
not clear as to how often and at what point eyewitness interviews might stray from ideal administrative practices to 
the point that the accuracy of the eyewitness reports become compromised (Wade et al., 2018). 
The Fallibility of Memory 
 In his book, On the Witness Stand, Münsterberg (1908) recounts a summer in which he had to face a jury as 
a witness and, throughout that process, details the way in which his own memory had been corrupted. While at the 
seashore with his family, Münsterberg’s city home had been broken into, and following the apprehension of an 
individual associated with the burglary, he was asked to report under oath an account of his findings. Münsterberg 
initially reported that the cellar window had been the point of entry for the burglars. Additionally, he had reported 
that on the second floor of his home, there had been drops of candle wax, implying that the burglars had been there 
at night. Lastly, he reported that there had been left behind on the dining room table, a mantel clock that had been 
covered with paper. Following his testimony, Münsterberg realized that the statements made on the stand were not 
entirely accurate. 
 The truth was that the burglars had not entered through the cellar window but instead had entered through 
the cellar door after having broken the lock. The drops of candle wax had not been found on the second floor of 
the city house, but instead had been found in the attic. The mantle clock that had been left behind covered in the 
paper was actually covered in a tablecloth, and while Münsterberg’s testimony referred to two burglars, there was 
no evidence suggesting that there had been more than one. While Münsterberg provides an honest recounting of 
events that speak to the fallibility of his own memory, he puts into perspective the issues relating to the memory of 
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the witness by discussing that, throughout the world, there are many courtrooms wherein witnesses under oath 
swear to an amalgam of truth and untruth produced by combinations of illusion, suggestion, and wrong conclusions. 
 Memory reports are often the evidence that determines an individual’s innocence or guilt and, in some 
cases, tend to be the only evidence that a crime has been committed (Brainerd & Reyna, 2019). A crucial legal 
concern is how knowledgeable individuals in legal settings are when it comes to how memory works (Howe & Knot, 
2015). There remain a variety of studies that have shown that judges, jurors, police, and other individuals, hold a 
number of unsophisticated beliefs about memories that oppose scientific research (e.g., Benton et al., 2006; Brewin 
et al., 2019; Magnussen et al., 2010; Rubin & Bernstein, 2007; Simons & Chabris, 2011). The degree to which 
nonexperts understand memory maintains a central role in the debate of whether there needs to be special education 
for individuals who serve a role within the legal field, as well as for expert testimony on memory in the courts 
(Brewin et al., 2019; Houston et al., 2013). 
 A disconcerting number of nonexperts view human memory as being equivalent to photographs or videos, 
and that notion is among the top ten great myths of popular psychology (Lilienfeld et al., 2010). The view that 
memory functions like a video camera among laypeople has been referred to as “typical” (Lacy & Stark, 2013) and 
“pervasive” (Clifasefi et al., 2007). Patihis et al. (2014) showed that 66.7% of college undergraduates agreed with the 
idea that everything that one experiences is stored permanently inside the brain. This is important because this type 
of belief may be common amongst jurors who decide the outcome of cases that rely on eyewitness memory. 
 Individuals who are unknowledgeable about factors that influence memory often place a great deal of trust 
in its accuracy; however, the truth of the matter is that it is not equivalent to photographs or videos, despite what 
many nonexperts think. Not only do individuals forget information over time or fail to encode specific information, 
but that information and what is encoded into memory is determined through the vantage point comprised of an 
individual’s own experiences, expectations, motivations, and emotional state (Benforado, 2015). That information is 
then consolidated with other information previously stored in an individual’s long-term memory and what is retrieved 
from that memory stems from the very same factors involved in the encoding of that information, as well as what is 
driving the recall of the specific event (Howe & Knot, 2015).  
 In the 1970s through the 1990s, there were many studies focusing on the role of erroneous information 
following a specific event and how that new information resulted in contaminated memory reports (Loftus, 2004). 
The tendency for erroneous post-event information to contaminate the memory of an original event became known 
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as the “misinformation effect.” Not only were hammers misremembered as screwdrivers and stop signs as yield 
signs, but broken shards of glass managed to work their way into memories of car accidents when the accidents 
themselves did not contain broken glass (Loftus, 2004; Reisberg, 2014). Other studies went further by planting 
entirely false memories using strong suggestions. A method known as the “familial-informant false-narrative 
procedure” (Lindsay et al., 2004) resulted in participants incorrectly believing that as children, they had been lost in 
a shopping mall, hospitalized overnight, or had experienced an unfortunate accident when attending a family wedding 
(Loftus, 1979; Loftus, 2004). 
 Studies have also shown ways in which false memories that are considered highly implausible, or even 
impossible, can be implanted. For example, Braun et al. (2002) examined how advertising can change our memories 
of the past and the ease in which a false memory can be planted involving the meeting of Bugs Bunny at Disneyland 
Resort. Participants viewed an ad showing Bugs Bunny next to the Cinderella Castle and were asked to evaluate the 
ad on a variety of characteristics. After having viewed the fake ad, 16% of participants later claimed that they had 
met Bugs Bunny, even though Bugs Bunny is a Warner Brothers character and thus, is unaffiliated with Disney. A 
study conducted later by Braun-LaTour et al. (2006) showed higher rates of false memories and that ads containing 
a picture of Bugs Bunny produced more false memories when compared to ads containing only a verbal mention of 
the Warner Brothers character. 
 This research is important as the lessons learned from DNA exonerations. A flawed memory is one of the 
leading causes of wrongful convictions, and the study of memory is vital in that it allows for scientific ways in which 
concerns about the justice system can be addressed. In his 1932 book, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social 
Psychology, Bartlett wrote a sobering characterization of memory, stating that, “It is an imaginative reconstruction, 
or construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organized past reactions or 
experience…It is thus hardly ever really exact.” (p. 213). The work of pioneering psychologists such as Münsterberg, 
Bartlett, and Loftus has shown that humans are the creators of their own memories, even details that do not stem 
from their own experiences. 
Jurors Believe Eyewitnesses 
 Jurisdictions all over the world ask jurors to assess the reliability of eyewitness evidence, and with that 
comes the challenge of doing so accurately and efficiently. A main goal in any court case would be for jurors to 
appropriately account for conditions experienced during witnessing or interviewing when assessing the reliability of 
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eyewitness evidence (Lane & Karam-Zanders, 2014). However, jurors are not knowledge to the extent that would 
allow them to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate testimony or identification decisions (Semmler et al., 
2012). Instead, jurors tend to rely on cues such as confidence, detail, and consistency. 
Confidence 
 Actors in the legal system often believe that confidence is linked to accuracy (Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1992; 
Potter & Brewer, 1999; Sauer & Brewer, 2015). Jury simulation studies have shown that confidence is the most 
powerful single predictor of how reliable a juror finds an eyewitness to be (e.g., Brewer & Burke, 2002; Cutler et al., 
1990; Fox & Walters, 1986; Leippe et al., 1992; Lindsay et al., 1989; Lindsay et al., 1981; Wells et al., 1981; Wells et 
al., 1979). For example, Cutler et al. (1990) examined juror sensitivity to eyewitness identification evidence in a 
population of experienced jurors and found that, of the factors associated with the crime and the identification (e.g., 
disguise of the perpetrator, retention interval, confidence of the eyewitness) that were manipulated, confidence of 
the eyewitness was the most powerful predictor of verdicts. Additionally, Lindsay et al. (1981) examined the impact 
of poor, moderate, or strong viewing conditions of a staged crime on identification accuracy and mock-jurors’ 
perception of eyewitness reliability. After viewing the staged crime under one of the three viewing conditions, 
eyewitnesses were asked to identify the culprit from a photo lineup and to report how confident they were in their 
identifications. Researchers found that the viewing conditions significantly affected identification accuracy (33%, 50%, 
and 74% accuracy in poor, moderate, and strong viewing conditions, respectively). However, the evaluations of 
eyewitnesses provided by mock-jurors were not similarly affected, given their over-belief of eyewitnesses (62%, 66%, 
and 77% belief for poor, moderate, and strong viewing conditions, respectively). Studies such as these show that 
jurors believe that eyewitnesses with high confidence are more accurate and, therefore, more reliable when 
compared to eyewitnesses with low confidence.  
 Researchers have made sure to distinguish clearly between the reliance on initial confidence statements and 
confidence statements taken at trial (Wixted & Wells, 2017). It has been suggested that courts and prosecutors 
should rely on initial confidence statements given that they are a matter of record as well as the fact that, under 
pristine conditions, research has shown that confidence and accuracy are related, and that high-confidence culprit 
identifications are notably accurate (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Unfortunately, courts generally allow witnesses to state 
their confidence at trial, at which point those statements can potentially be inflated due to confirmatory feedback, 
information learned throughout the investigation, pretrial preparation, coaching, depositions, and repeated 
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identifications (Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Wixted & Wells, 2017). For example, think back to the case of John Jerome 
White that was described earlier, in which the victim’s confidence grew with each identification. 
Detail 
 A convincing cue that jurors also rely on is the amount of detail provided in an eyewitness’s testimony. Like 
that of confidence, actors in the legal system also believe that detail is linked to accuracy (Bell & Loftus, 1988; 
Semmler et al., 2012). For example, there is the notion that the more specific details an eyewitness can remember, 
the more accurate the memory (Howe & Knott, 2015). In a study conducted by Bell and Loftus (1988), researchers 
found that mock jurors perceived the testimony given by eyewitnesses to be more reliable when more detail was 
provided. Not only is the testimony given by an eyewitness considered to be more reliable, they are also perceived 
as having a better memory when it comes to other relevant details, such as the culprit’s face (Bell & Loftus, 1989). 
Ultimately, witnesses that provide a higher level of detail are favored by jurors and, as a result, can sway them when 
compared to witnesses with a lower level of detail. While jurors may favor witnesses who provide a higher level of 
detail, their faith is misplaced given that many studies have shown that accuracy, extensiveness, and consistency of 
crime-related details and descriptions of the culprit are not strongly associated with identification accuracy (see 
Cutler & Penrod, 1995, for more detail). 
Consistency 
 Another misleading but convincing cue that jurors rely on is consistency. Consistency as a predictor of 
memory accuracy has been researched extensively, and the results are complex (Fisher et al., 2013). Research has 
shown that among judges, attorneys, police officers, and laypeople, the most predictive measure of perceived 
eyewitness inaccuracy was inconsistent testimony (e.g., Brewer & Burke, 2002; Brewer & Hupfeld, 2004; Brewer et 
al., 1999). Additionally, researchers have also shown that mock jurors perceive consistent witnesses to be more 
credible when compared to less consistent witnesses (e.g., Berman & Cutler, 1996; Lindsay et al., 1986). In fact, 
eyewitness reporting and the dependency placed on it has become a focus in law schools. If one were to pick up a 
textbook on cross-examination practices and procedures, one would come across the suggestion to monitor closely, 
or even construct, inconsistencies in (an opponents’) eyewitnesses’ testimonies to impeach them (Fisher et al., 2013). 
 The issue surrounding consistency is complex, given research findings and courtroom practices. It has 
already been established that actors in the legal system (e.g., judges, attorneys, police officers) believe that consistent 
testimony is more credible than inconsistent testimony; however, scientific research has painted an interesting 
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picture. Over the course of multiple response opportunities, eyewitnesses at trial may report information not 
included during their initial questioning — an occurrence known as reminiscence (Stanley & Benjamin, 2016). Stanley 
and Benjamin (2016) found that reminiscent items were as accurate as items initially reported, but not later, 
suggesting that the prediction of lower accuracy stems from the inconsistency of recall, not the later addition to the 
recall. Additionally, Gilbert and Fisher (2006) found that there was no evidence to support the theory that 
reminiscence is predictive of the inaccuracy of eyewitnesses’ overall testimony. These findings are particularly 
interesting, given that they violate the notion that memory gets worse over time (Fisher et al., 2013).  
 While forgotten and reminiscent statements have been found to be almost as accurate to consistent 
statements, it is contradictory statements that have been shown to be significantly less accurate than consistent 
statements (Fisher et al., 2013). Examining the accuracy rates of consistent and contradictory statements, Gilbert 
and Fisher (2006) found that the accuracy rate of consistent statements was higher than that of contradictory 
statements (0.95 and 0.49, respectively). However, at the level of the individual eyewitness, those who made many 
contradictory statements were not much less accurate compared to eyewitnesses who provided few or no 
contradictory statements (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). According to Fisher et al. (2013), “There is an apparent 
conundrum here: contradictory statements are much less accurate than consistent statements, yet witnesses who 
make many contradictory statements are almost as accurate as witnesses who make none or a few contradictory 
statements” (p. 178). Studies have shown that the reason for such a conundrum is explained by the idea that when 
recalling a complex event, the level of memory accuracy attributed to one dimension of an event (e.g., offender 
description, offender actions, objects), does not reflect the accuracy level of other dimensions (Brewer et al., 1999; 
Fisher et al., 2000). As Fisher et al. (2013) further explains, “Inconsistency of recollection informs us about the specific 
statement that is reported inconsistently, but it tells us little or nothing about the accuracy of the rest of the witness’s 
testimony” (p. 178). This is important given that when trial attorneys identify a contradiction, they tend to generalize 
it to the entire testimony of the witness. 
Conclusion 
 As noted in the previous sections, the reasons for which a misidentification and wrongful conviction can 
occur can be multifaceted and complex. In State v. White (1980), there were many reasons resulting in the conviction, 
some more evident than others. The fact that the victim in White’s case identified him on three separate occasions 
(i.e., photo array, live lineup, and in the courtroom), was arguably one of the most influential factors leading to his 
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conviction. However, the use of repeated identification procedures employed throughout the case contained a 
significant flaw. Given that White was the only individual to appear in both the initial eight-person photo array as 
well as the five-person live lineup, this allowed for an increased risk of misidentification. Prior research examining 
the effects of commitment and misplaced familiarity in repeated lineups has shown that identification errors made 
during an initial lineup carry forward to subsequent lineups (e.g., Lin et al., 2019; Steblay et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
while White’s location in the initial photo array was never specified, it may have been the case that his photo 
placement would have further increased his likelihood of being selected, given that prior research has shown that 
witnesses favor center lineup locations in a photo array when compared to edges and corners (e.g., Palmer et al., 
2017). Lastly, another reason for the misidentification of White may have been that he was black, and the victim was 
white. The consistent finding that adults are better able to recognize individuals of their own race when compared 
to the faces of a less familiar race (e.g., Brigham et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2016; Wright et al., 2001) would allow for 
an increased risk of misidentification. 
 As far as estimator variables connected to the victim, she was not wearing her prescribed corrective lenses 
at the time of the attack; this may have negatively affected her vision. Another factor was that she was seventy-four 
years old. Prior research has shown that older adults make more errors when attempting to identify a culprit in a 
lineup (e.g., Fitzgerald & Price, 2015), provide testimonies that are less detailed and less accurate (e.g., Brimacombe 
et al., 1997), and are more susceptible to suggestibility (for review, see Wylie et al., 2014). As far as the crime, it 
took place in the early morning when it was pitch black, with the only light coming from a small walk-in closet in a 
connecting room. As one may imagine, prior research has shown that, as lighting conditions increase, recognition 
memory abilities increase (e.g., Wagenaar and van der Schrier, 1996). Furthermore, the crime was estimated to have 
taken fifteen minutes, part of which the victim spent holding a pillow to her face until the assailant left. Prior research 
has shown that eyewitnesses tend to overestimate the duration of an encounter (e.g., Yarmey, 1993), as well as the 
fact that exposure duration is associated with identification accuracy (e.g., MacLin et al., 2001; Shapiro & Penrod, 
1986). Given the nature of the crime, the victim’s cognitive stress and physiological arousal may have impaired recall 
of crime-related details and the ability to identify the assailant correctly — an effect of stress found in prior research 





III. The Effects of Stress on Eyewitness Memory 
 When it comes to eyewitness testimony, stress is considered a psychologically complex estimator variable 
and an essential component that has been a focus for researchers examining its effects on memory. The degree and 
circumstances in which memory becomes enhanced or impaired is still an issue of concern in eyewitness literature. 
Theoretical models (e.g., Yerkes-Dodson law, Easterbrook hypothesis, Deffenbacher’s (1994) catastrophe model of 
memory performance under anxiety) have attempted to account for stress and its effects on memory performance, 
providing a multitude of explanations. However, multiple explanations stemming from theoretical models reflect the 
inconsistencies in methods and findings from previous studies. Therefore, further research examining stress and 
eyewitness memory is needed. 
Mechanisms 
 Researchers have typically examined the relationship between stress and memory using three different 
explanations, the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), the Easterbrook hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1959), 
and the catastrophe model of memory performance under anxiety (Deffenbacher, 1994). These explanations are 
described below, followed by a discussion of naturalistic and laboratory approaches to examining the effects of stress 
on memory. 
Yerkes-Dodson Law 
 Yerkes and Dodson (1908) used a visual discrimination task to examine the effects of different shock 
intensities on the rate of learning for mice. In the study, mice would come across two differently colored electric 
boxes; one white and one black (see Figure 1). Mice entering the black box would receive a shock before returning 
to the starting area, while those entering the white box would be permitted to return to the starting area shock-
free. A key manipulation was brightness, which made the discrimination of the two boxes either simple (black vs. 









Discrimination Box and Ground Plan from Yerkes and Dodson (1908) 
 
 
Note. Mice originated in a starting area (A), and then after entering the chamber (B), they had options to enter one 
of two boxes (L or R). 
 
 
 Researchers found that the rate of learning in the simple visual discrimination task, improved linearly with 
the increase in shock intensity, while the rate of learning in the difficult visual discrimination task, was most effective 
with the medium shock intensity, compared to both a weak and strong shock intensity (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). 
The findings led Yerkes and Dodson (1908) to conclude that “an easily acquired habit, that is one which does not 
demand difficult sense discriminations or complex associations, may readily be formed under strong stimulation, 
whereas a difficult habit may be acquired readily only under relatively weak stimulation” (pp. 481-482). In the 1950s, 
the functions of shock intensity and learning became the foundation for the inverted-U relationship between arousal 
and performance (see Figure 2; Hebb, 1995; Johnson & Proctor, 2017; Saal, 2004). In eyewitness literature, the 
Yerkes-Dodson law, or inverted-U hypothesis, states that as arousal or stress increases, memory performance 
increases up to a certain point and that arousal or stress levels that go past that optimum point, negatively affect 
memory performance (Gerrie et al., 2005). While there have been many criticisms and debates surrounding the 
Yerkes-Dodson law over the decades (Diamond et al., 2007), it remains a prominent theoretical model among 




Illustration of the Yerkes-Dodson Law 
 
 
Note. A Hebbian version of the Yerkes-Dodson law, representing how arousal interacts with cognition using a 




 The Easterbrook hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1959), or cue utilization theory, accounts for the Yerkes-Dodson 
law and states that, at high levels of stress, there is a narrowing of attention specific to the central details of an event, 
and that the narrowing of attention to central details comes at the expense of peripheral details (Howe et al., 2018). 
In other words, even though one’s memory performance for central details increases at high levels of stress, the 
overall accuracy and recollection of the event become compromised. Many studies, such as those examining the 
weapon focus effect, are supported by this theoretical model. Research has shown that the presence of a weapon 
works as an attention magnet (Laney et al., 2003), drawing the attention of the eyewitness and leading to poor recall 
and recognition of the culprit (Christianson, 1992; Howe et al., 2018; Steblay, 1992). Many studies support both the 






Catastrophe Model of Memory Performance Under Anxiety 
 The catastrophe model of memory performance under anxiety (Deffenbacher, 1994), is a three-dimensional 
model that has two predictor variables, cognitive anxiety (worry) and somatic anxiety (conscious perception of 
physiological activation), and one criterion variable, performance (Deffenbacher, 1994; Deffenbacher et al., 2004). 
More specifically, the model proposes that cognitive anxiety and somatic anxiety interact to influence performance. 
Drawing from Tucker and Williamson's (1984) asymmetric neural control systems model and Fazey and Hardy's 
(1988) catastrophe model of anxiety and performance, Deffenbacher (1994) proposed that when cognitive anxiety 
is relatively high, increases in somatic anxiety will initially result in gradual increases in performance, however, only 
up to a critical point. When that critical point is reached, there is a catastrophic breakdown leading to an immediate 
drop in performance (Deffenbacher, 1994; Deffenbacher et al., 2004). The catastrophe model of memory 
performance under anxiety explains many findings in stress and eyewitness memory literature, and like most 
theoretical models, requires further research. While the Yerkes-Dodson law and Easterbrook hypothesis are models 
that explain various aspects of how stress affects attention and performance, and both serve as crucial precepts of 
psychology, both lack a three-dimensional framework such as that put forth by Deffenbacher’s (1994) catastrophe 
model of memory performance under anxiety. 
Principal Methods Examining the Effects of Stress on Eyewitness Memory 
 When conducting research on stress and eyewitness memory, there are three principal components: 
laboratory experiments, naturalistic studies, and meta-analysis (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). The comparison of 
memory performance between laboratory experiments and naturalistic settings is essential, with the latter using 
three main approaches: archival studies, case studies, and staged crime or field studies (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 
2019). Archival studies involve the post-hoc analysis of specific patterns of information reported to the police and 
contained in police records from a substantial number of cases (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019; Woolnough & 
MacLeod, 2001). Case studies involve the analysis of data from a smaller number of cases and utilize additional data 
often collected through researcher interviews of witnesses (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019). Staged crime or field 
studies involve the analysis of data collected from individuals who have witnessed a staged or real crime, while system 
or estimator variables are often manipulated (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019). There not only exists a level of overlap 





 Laboratory-based methods are useful because they allow researchers an additional level of control when 
compared to naturalistic studies. One notable advantage that laboratory experiments provide researchers is the 
ability to manipulate specific event characteristics that are believed to influence witnesses’ arousal levels while holding 
other characteristics of the event constant (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009; Christianson, 1992; Libkuman et al., 
1999). Unfortunately, laboratory studies themselves fall victim to a variety of limitations. First, witnesses in laboratory 
experiments are usually bystanders – in other words, unlike real crimes, they are not victims, nor are they actively 
participating in the event (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). Given that witnesses in such studies are usually not active 
participants, they may not elicit the level of engagement or real threat that witnesses of real crime do. As noted by 
Hervé et al. (2013), “Participants in analogue research, however, do not experience extreme stress or experience 
something very violent. Rather, they view stimuli under the conditions of low stress” (p. 106). Second, laboratory 
studies do not adequately, if at all, measure arousal and assume that certain stimuli, such as violence, would induce 
negative emotion (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). Last, researchers conducting laboratory experiments are limited 
in what they can ethically do, and even when it comes to inducing arousal, they can only do so to a moderate extent 
given the current ethical guidelines adopted by researchers and enforced by Institutional Review Boards (American 
Psychological Association, 2017; Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). As such, researchers attempting to induce negative 
emotions must do so with the use of moderate stimuli. Furthermore, informed consent requires researchers to 
notify participants in advance the exposure to stressful material and, in doing so, can result in participants perceiving 
a gruesome photo or violent video as less stressful than intended (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). However, while 
limitations for laboratory experiments examining arousal and eyewitness memory have limitations, they do allow 
researchers the ability to isolate arousal from other variables (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). 
 In one of the earliest laboratory experiments examining the effects of arousal on eyewitness memory, 
Clifford and Scott (1978) had participants view either a violent or non-violent video involving the search for a criminal 
by two police officers with the help of a reluctant third person. In the non-violent video, the reluctancy of the third 
individual results in one of the two police officers carrying out several weak restraining movements. In the violent 
video, the two police officers physically assault the reluctant third person, exchanging numerous blows. Researchers 
found that participants who watched the violent film recalled significantly less detail when compared to participants 
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who had viewed the non-violent video. Additionally, researchers found that in the violent condition, females were 
significantly less accurate when compared to male participants — a similar finding found by Kuehn (1974). 
 In a similar study, Loftus and Burns (1982) presented participants with two versions of a short bank robbery 
video produced by the Idaho First National Bank. The robbery involved an individual who holds up a teller and then, 
after robbing the bank, walks out the door to the getaway car, only to be chased by two employees of the bank in a 
parking lot where two boys are playing. In the violent video, the robber fires a shot, which ends up hitting one of 
the boys playing in the parking lot in the face. In the non-violent video, the events are identical up until the moment 
of the shooting, when instead, the video flashes to the bank showing the manager speaking to employees and 
customers about the robbery that just took place. Researchers found that the violent arousing event resulted in 
fewer correct details recalled when compared to the non-violent video, especially details that were present just 
before the shooting (Loftus & Burns, 1982). 
 In examining details recalled for information that comes before, during, and after an arousing violent event, 
Bornstein et al. (1998) presented to participants either a violent or a non-violent version of a film. Both the initial 
and concluding segments of the film were identical for each condition, while the middle segment differed in that the 
violent video contained a murder scene, while the non-violent version did not. Researchers found that in the non-
violent condition, participants recalled more details for the initial and concluding segment when compared to the 
middle segment (Bornstein et al., 1998). However, in the violent condition, participants recalled more detail in the 
middle segment when compared to both the initial and concluding segments (Bornstein et al., 1998). Studies such as 
these illustrate how arousal can impair or enhance memory. More specifically, they illustrate the role arousal can 
play when it comes to recalling information that comes before and after an event, when compared to the event itself.  
Naturalistic Studies 
 Naturalistic-based methods allow researchers to assess the memory of real witnesses of real crimes or 
events. A notable advantage of naturalistic studies is that it allows researchers to examine naturally occurring 
phenomena (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). In the context of eyewitness studies, researchers can examine memory 
as it is affected by arousal from the situation — in other words; researchers are not deliberately inducing arousal in 
eyewitnesses (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). As noted in the previous section, because of ethical considerations, 
researchers cannot induce arousal at levels that might appear in a real-life frightening or violent event. Thus, arousal 
levels in naturalistic studies can become higher than those in laboratory studies. However, even though naturalistic 
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studies allow for a richness that cannot be found in laboratory studies, the lack of experimental control can be 
problematic and result in a variety of drawbacks (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). 
 Archival Studies. Archival studies involve an analysis of reported information found in police case files to 
identify associations between crucial variables (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019). These studies can provide valuable 
information regarding the frequency with which eyewitnesses make correct identifications, the variables that predict 
the likelihood of identifications, the completeness of reports, the accuracy of details reported, and the potentially 
biasing effects of pre-existing witness relationships (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019; Woolnough & MacLeod, 2001). In 
an archival study conducted by Tollestrup et al. (1994), researchers analyzed cases that included robberies from the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police to examine the influence of crime violence on the number of details provided by 
victims and witnesses. In examining the impact of arousal and threat, researchers found that victims of robbery (who 
most likely experienced higher arousal levels) were found to provide the most information regarding the culprit’s 
physical appearance when compared to witnesses of robbery (who likely experienced lower arousal levels; Tollestrup 
et al., 1994). In a similar study, Behrman and Davey (2001) analyzed cases that included armed robberies from the 
Sacramento Police Department. In contrast to Tollestrup et al. (1994), researchers found that when it came to 
eyewitness performance, the difference between victims and witnesses was not statistically significant (Behrman & 
Davey, 2001). Although high in realism, the previously discussed studies have a severe limitation in that, while they 
attempt to examine the role of violence, there is no direct measure of crime violence (Cutler & Kovera, 2010). 
Other archival studies have looked at the effects of arousal on eyewitness memory by comparing witness reports 
for crimes that involved either physical or no physical injury to the victim. 
 In studying the victims of traumatic events, Kuehn (1974) analyzed data from police reports, examining the 
capability to provide details of the crimes and assailants. After analyzing reports composed of homicides (individuals 
who died following the providing of information), rapes, assaults, and robberies, notable findings were reported. 
First, injured victims, regardless of the crime, reported less information when compared to non-injured victims. 
Second, victims of robberies reported fuller descriptions of the assailant when compared to victims of rape or assault. 
Third, physical characteristics such as gender, build, and height, were more frequently reported when compared to 
hair color and eye color. Last, notable differences in sex were also reported. Males reported fuller descriptions of 
assailants when compared to females. In cases of robbery and assault (excluding rape), males reported fuller 
descriptions when compared to females. Furthermore, injured males reported fuller descriptions when compared 
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to injured females. While the findings reported by Kuehn (1974) are notable, the completeness of reports may 
possibly indicate perceptual recall; however, the reports themselves may not be accurate. Similarly, MacLeod and 
Shephard (1986) analyzed 379 statements concerning 135 cases of real-life assaults, finding that in cases of injury, 
males reported more details of their assailant when compared to females. 
 While archival studies can provide valuable information, they are limited in that it is often difficult or 
impossible to corroborate the accuracy of statements and identifications in the cases being analyzed (Bornstein & 
Neuschatz, 2019). For example, police cases where culprits have not been apprehended serve as a major limitation 
to the accuracy of information provided by victims or witnesses. Even though corroborating evidence (e.g., 
confession, report or identification made by another witness, and surveillance video footage) can be present in 
archival studies to assist in determining whether the suspect was actually guilty or whether the witness’s statement 
was correct, these forms of evidence are typically absent and can themselves, be unreliable (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 
2019). However, corroborating evidence is strongly suggestive of eyewitness accuracy in the field, and the results of 
both archival studies and laboratory experiments of eyewitness memory are primarily consistent with one another 
(Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019). 
  Case Studies. Where archival studies focus on a database of police records, case studies examine 
witnesses to one or a handful of crimes, relying on the information provided during researcher interviews of 
witnesses (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019). Case studies themselves can provide rich information given that what is 
being examined, typically is accompanied by a narrower focus. For example, Yuille and Cutshall (1986) interviewed 
13 witnesses to a shooting that took place in Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, that left one individual dead and a 
second seriously wounded. Following the incident, police obtained reports from each eyewitness that included a free 
recall of the event that transpired, as well as a structured interview pertaining to crucial aspects of the event. Four 
to five months following the incident, witnesses were interviewed again by researchers using the same procedures, 
while also rating their level of stress at the time of the incident on a 7-point scale. The results showed a high degree 
of accuracy and little decline over time of correct details recalled between witnesses in the high-stress and low-
stress groups (police interview, 93.36% and 75.13%, respectively; researcher interview, 88.24% and 75.88%, 
respectively). Furthermore, there was no association between witnesses’ stress level and their accuracy, concluding 
that levels of stress are unrelated to accuracy. However, the five witnesses who reported the highest amount of 
stress were also the same five witnesses who had contact with either the thief, store owner, or weapon, resulting 
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in stress being confounded with the degree of involvement and proximity to detail that was to be recalled. Thus, the 
findings do not allow for the possibility of a full interpretation (Goodman & Loftus, 1989). Despite such limitations, 
other case studies have found similar results (e.g., Christianson & Hübinette, 1993).  
 The conclusions from case studies tend to be at odds with those from other methods, in that they caution 
against the notion that eyewitness memory is unreliable (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019). While various case studies 
have concluded that eyewitness memory can be reliable, this conclusion stems from research methods that have 
important limitations. For example, one of the challenges of case studies is that sample sizes tend to be small, and 
this leads to problems with generalizations and makes it difficult to examine the effects of stress on eyewitness recall 
and identification accuracy. Additionally, controlling for extraneous factors and being able to corroborate what 
occurred in each case is met with challenges (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019). Perhaps one of the most difficult 
limitations in case studies is estimating an individual’s emotional state. Given that an individual’s emotional state 
cannot be measured at the time of the event, researchers will often ask for an individual to recall their level of stress 
long after the crime has taken place. Overall, the relationship between emotion and memory can be difficult to 
examine and generalize in the context of case studies (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 2019). 
 Staged Crime or Field Studies. Staged crime or field studies involve researchers staging events in the 
lab or the field in which stress is experimentally manipulated or varies naturally across conditions (Bornstein & 
Neuschatz, 2019). The resources needed for such studies come at a cost, particularly given that they can require 
police officers, service members, or real witnesses. Due to the hurdles presented in conducting staged crime or field 
studies, there are few that have been conducted. While such studies involve deception and are difficult to conduct, 
more are needed because they have provided valuable, but mixed, information regarding high levels of stress and the 
impact it has on eyewitness recall and identification accuracy. 
  In a study conducted by Sauerland et al. (2016), participants were randomly assigned to a high-stress and 
low-stress condition during a staged crime. To measure stress, researchers obtained cortisol stress measures at four 
different time points. When a lineup was administered one week later, the researchers found that there was no 
effect of high stress on memory performance when attempting to identify the culprit from both target-present and 
target-absent lineups. However, it is important to note that while Sauerland et al. (2016) found that stress did not 
impair eyewitness identification, other studies have shown the opposite effect.  
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  Peters (1988) examined the effects of physiological activation on memory in a population of individuals at 
an immunization clinic. After having received an inoculation from a nurse at the clinic, witnesses had their heart rate 
taken by another staff member 2 minutes following the inoculation. For both the nurse and other individual, witnesses 
were asked to provide a physical description and presented a photo lineup. The results showed that physiological 
arousal was significantly higher at the time of inoculation (88 beats per minute (bpm)) when compared to 2 minutes 
later (71 bpm) and that the number of correct details and correct identifications made for the nurse was lower when 
compared to the other staff member. 
 In a study using visitors to the London Dungeon’s Horror Labyrinth (i.e., a type of haunted house), Valentine 
and Mesout (2009) examined an individual’s ability to correctly identify and recall correct details of a culprit as a 
function of their state anxiety. Journeying through the Horror Labyrinth, participants encountered a “scary person” 
with pale skin and scars who stepped out in front of them, blocking their path. Forty-five minutes following the 
encounter, participants completed a state anxiety questionnaire, followed by a memory questionnaire and 
identification task. The researchers found that 75% of participants who scored below the median on state anxiety 
were able to correctly identify the culprit (i.e., scary actor), compared to 17% of participants who scored above the 
median. Thus, high state anxiety was associated with reporting fewer correct details of the culprit, more incorrect 
details, and a higher likelihood of incorrect identifications. The researchers also found that the mean state anxiety 
score was higher for females when compared to males, and that females made fewer correct identifications when 
compared to males. The work of Valentine and Mesout (2009) is particularly unique given that participants’ arousal 
was assessed using both physiological (i.e., heart rate) and psychological (i.e., self-report) measurements (Bornstein 
& Robicheaux, 2009). 
 The effect of state anxiety in Valentine and Mesout (2009) was consistent with one of the most often-cited 
field studies in eyewitness literature (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004). Morgan et al. (2004) examined the effects of stress 
on eyewitness accuracy using soldiers at a survival training school. Soldiers were exposed to the stress of sleep and 
food deprivation for approximately 48 hours prior to being interrogated in a mock prisoner of war camp. With a 
counterbalanced design, soldiers individually underwent either a low-stress interrogation (without physical 
confrontation) followed by a high-stress interrogation (with physical confrontation), or the interrogations in the 
opposite order. Twenty-four hours following the interrogation, soldiers were asked to identify their interrogator. 
Regardless of the methods used to identify crime suspects (i.e., live line-up method, photo-spread method, sequential 
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photo method), eyewitness recall was less accurate for soldiers in the high-stress interrogation when compared to 
soldiers in the low-stress interrogation (Morgan et al., 2004). While other studies have shown that emotional events 
are remembered more accurately than neutral events, memory under highly stressful events are still at risk for error 
and may not possess the level of specificity and accuracy needed for the legal system (Morgan et al., 2004). 
 Altogether, staged crime or field studies, while difficult to conduct, can address various drawbacks that exist 
with other naturalistic-based methods. First, witnesses have unique experiences for the same event, which creates a 
level of difficulty when attempting to compare participants collectively (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). For example, 
witnesses to the same crime have different vantage points, safety concerns or goals, and viewing opportunities, which 
makes certain comparisons (e.g., high arousal vs. low arousal) more difficult. Second, real crimes are not planned to 
the extent they are in laboratory studies, which makes it difficult for researchers to correctly obtain actual event 
facts to assess accuracy (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). Lastly, physiological arousal cannot be measured for real 
crimes, and this makes it difficult to examine the effects of stress on eyewitness memory in a naturalistic way. Despite 
these drawbacks, the previously discussed studies (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004; Peters, 1988; Valentine & Mesout, 2009) 
have successfully exerted an ideal degree of experimental control over naturally occurring, arousing situations 
(Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). 
Meta-Analysis 
 Meta-analysis is a statistical technique used to make sense of a collection of separate studies on a specific 
topic of interest. When examining a specific phenomenon, meta-analytic findings allow for a definitive statement to 
be made, and in the case of psycholegal meta-analyses focusing on various characteristics of eyewitness recall and 
identification accuracy, those findings have found their way into the courtroom (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009; see 
Penrod & Bornstein, 2007). While meta-analysis has the notable advantage of combining existing literature in a field 
into sensible conclusions, such a technique is not a perfect solution. While coding limitations can affect meta-analysis, 
Bornstein and Robicheaux (2009) conclude that “meta-analysis is only as good as the data that produce it” (p. 539). 
 In a meta-analysis of the effects of stress on eyewitness identification, Deffenbacher et al. (2004) analyzed 
16 published papers examining the effect of heightened stress on accuracy of face identification and 18 published 
papers examining the effect of heightened stress on accuracy of eyewitness recall. Each sample was comprised of 
studies that elicited a defensive response (activation mode of attention control), rather than an orienting response 
(arousal mode of attention control). Deffenbacher et al. (2004) found that high levels of stress negatively impact both 
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the accuracy of eyewitness identification as well as the accuracy of recall of crime-related details. Additionally, in 
looking at the difference between six eyewitness identification studies employing a staged crime and sixteen 
eyewitness identification studies employing other means to induce stress, Deffenbacher et al. (2004) found that for 
staged-crime studies, the mean proportions correct under high- and low-stress conditions were .33 and .50, 
respectively, and that for studies manipulating stress by other means, the mean proportions correct under high- and 
low-stress conditions were .56 and .69, respectively. While the meta-analysis conducted by Deffenbacher et al. (2004) 
remains notable, various aspects surrounding the 22 studies examining the presence or absence of a staged crime 
have drawn criticism in the form of limitations pertaining to the sample of studies analyzed; an issue that Sauerland 
et al. (2016) sought to correct when including a staged crime for high ecological validity, a retention interval of at 
least 24 hours, and physiological measures of stress, in a single design. Despite various limitations in the studies 
analyzed, overall, Bornstein and Robicheaux (2009) point out that the findings reported by Deffenbacher et al. (2004) 
are important in that they address the extent to which researchers can generalize from laboratory experiments to 
naturalistic settings. 
Conclusion 
 So, what is the effect of stress on eyewitness memory? The answer to this question has been pursued for 
some time, only to still have inconsistent results (e.g., Deffenbacher, 1983; Deffenbacher et al., 2004; Christianson, 
1992; Reisberg & Heuer, 2007). As discussed in this section, there is evidence from a variety of studies showing that 
stress can enhance, impair, or have no effect on memory. The reason for such a broad range of evidence is due to 
the fact that stress has cognitive, physiological, and subjective/affective components (Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). 
Furthermore, in investigating how negative emotion and stress influence memory, Howe et al. (2018) point out that 
it depends on “the way emotion is assessed (e.g., emotional saliency of the event vs. emotional distress of 
participants), the severity of that stress, the time between encoding and retrieval, and the kind of information being 
recalled (e.g., central vs. peripheral details of an event; p. 83).” Clearly, more work needs to be done to examine 
this issue.  
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IV. Current Research 
Purpose of Study 
 Avoiding the limitations of laboratory-based methods, the current study examined the prediction derived 
from Deffenbacher’s (1994) catastrophe model of memory performance under anxiety — in that, during a scenario 
that induces cognitive anxiety, high physiological arousal can result in an impairment in memory performance — 
using naturalistic-based methods (Deffenbacher et al., 2004).  Influenced by the work of Valentine and Mesout (2009), 
two experiments were conducted to examine participants’ recall and identification of actors following the completion 
of an extreme haunt and haunted house. In both experiments, participants were presented with a situation that 
posed a level of perceived personal threat, but that occurs during the normal course of everyday life. Participants 
were unknowingly tested on their memory of the events and actors encountered.  
 This study, in part, sought to replicate the work of Valentine and Mesout (2009), showing that females will 
report higher state anxiety when compared to males, that males will make more correct identifications when 
compared to females, and that participants high in state anxiety will recall fewer correct details and make fewer 
correct identifications when compared to participants low in state anxiety. Experiment 1 added to the study 
conducted by Valentine and Mesout (2009) by introducing two culprits in a simulated assault scenario, with one 
actor becoming extremely physical with each participant (i.e., assailant), while the other actor stood in the same 
room and watched the simulated assault (i.e., observer). The use of two culprits in this manner has yet to be seen 
in eyewitness literature. Experiment 2 added to the study conducted by Valentine and Mesout (2009) by examining 
eyewitness recall and identification accuracy of an actor outside the haunted house prior to entering (i.e., control 
culprit), as well as an actor encountered during the haunted house (i.e., experimental culprit). This method allowed 
for a comparison of eyewitness recall and identification accuracy between the actor encountered during baseline, 
and the actor encountered during high physiological arousal and cognitive stress. The use of two culprits encountered 
during different states of measured physiological arousal and cognitive stress has also yet to be seen in eyewitness 
literature to this extent. 
 Ensuring that the extreme haunt and haunted house induced an activation mode of attention control, 
Spielberger’s (1983) State Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) and wireless heart rate monitors were used to measure state 
anxiety and physiological activation as beats per minute (bpm). Recall of the event and actor appearance, as well as 
identification outcome using a target-present or target-absent lineup, served as dependent measures. Analyses 
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conducted included a correlational design, Welch’s t-test, multiple linear and logistic regression models, and one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA). In examining the degree of sensation seeking among participants relative to other 
groups, scores from Zuckerman’s (1994) Sensation-Seeking Scale (SSS Form V) were assessed. 
Hypotheses 
General 
  Previous field studies have shown that high levels of stress negatively impact eyewitness recall and 
identification accuracy (Morgan et al., 2004; Valentine & Mesout, 2009). Thus, it is predicted that participants who 
are higher in state anxiety will recall fewer correct details, recall more incorrect details, and make fewer correct 
identifications, when compared to participants lower in state anxiety — effects consistent with Deffenbacher’s (1994) 
catastrophe model of memory performance under anxiety. There exists a stark contrast between the strong 
confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship typically found in laboratory studies and the CA relationship in the real world, 
as evidenced by the number of DNA exonerations that stem from false identifications (Bornstein & Neuschatz, 
2019). However, given the additional control of the current study, such as an immediate confidence assessment, it 
is predicted that post-identification confidence will be a reliable predictor of identification accuracy. While previous 
laboratory studies have shown that females are superior in face recognition despite target sex (Areh, 2011; Rehn 
Herlitz, 2007), these studies did not induce stress. Last, taking into consideration that females, on average, score 
higher than males on anxiety (e.g., Spielberger, 1983), it is predicted that females will score higher on state anxiety 
and make fewer correct identifications when compared to males — a finding shown in previous research utilizing a 
similar study design (e.g., Valentine and Mesout, 2009). 
Experiment 1 
  Stress can be operationalized with regard to environmental and perceiver characteristics (Bornstein & 
Neuschatz, 2019; Bornstein & Robicheaux, 2009). Given that previous research has shown that stress can assist 
memory for central details of an event and impair recall of peripheral details (Reisburg & Heuer, 2007) and eyewitness 
identification (Deffenbacher et al., 2004),  it is predicted that participants will recall more correct details, recall fewer 
incorrect details, and make more correct identifications of the assailant when compared to the observer. 
Experiment 2 
 As previously discussed, field studies have shown that high levels of stress negatively impact eyewitness 
recall and identification accuracy (Morgan et al., 2004; Valentine & Mesout, 2009). Due to the expected increase in 
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physiological arousal and cognitive stress while in the haunted house, it is predicted that participants will recall more 
correct details, recall fewer incorrect details, and make more correct identifications of the control culprits 
encountered prior to entering the haunted house when compared to the experimental culprit encountered while in 






Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and Heart Rate 
 Ten of the total 22 participants in the current experiment contributed data to the analysis and had a mean 
age of 49.1 years (SD = 9.42, range 20-58 years); 4 were male, and 6 were female. Due to technical difficulties 
pertaining to the other recordings of heart rate data, the other twelve participants were excluded. 
Eyewitness Performance 
 Twenty-two participants attending Science of HVRTING (see below) provided complete data that was 
analyzed for cued recall of both the assailant and observer. They had a mean age of 40.1 years (SD = 9.34, range 19-
58 years); 13 were male, and 9 were female. Sixteen of the 22 participants provided data that was analyzed for free 
recall of the simulated physical assault, given that 6 participants did not provide any information. They had a mean 
age of 38.8 years (SD = 10.03, range 19-58 years); 8 were male, and 8 were female. 
Materials and Procedure 
Setting 
 The Science of HVRTING was a Los Angeles-based extreme haunt produced by the company HVRTING. 
Extreme haunts are unique in that they belong to the underground world of immersive horror in which attendees 
experience extreme physical and psychological situations that include a lengthy consent process and a safe word. 
Throughout the experience were a variety of rooms, each providing a different experience. Informed consent was 
obtained prior to entering the extreme haunt, and participants were told that they would be answering questions 
related to their extreme haunt experience. Participants were admitted one at a time, and the immersive experience 
lasted 90 minutes. Each participant entered the extreme haunt alone, going into a series of rooms in a fixed order. 
Of the many situations encountered, the last situation involved each participant entering a room in which they 
experienced a simulated physical assault for 5 minutes by an actor (i.e., assailant), while another actor watched (i.e., 
observer) while standing within 10 feet of the experience. Each of the actors wore a different colored Colombina 
mask (i.e., a type of masquerade half-mask). The assailant wore a white Hawaiian shirt displaying Macaws and split-
leaf philodendrons, as well as khaki shorts, while the observer wore a white Hawaiian shirt displaying pink flamingos 




 Heart rate was measured as beats per minute (bpm) using a Polar OH1 wireless heart rate monitor. The 
wireless heart rate monitor was fitted to the participant’s forearm approximately 15 minutes prior to the start of 
the extreme haunt, allowing for the average baseline heart rate to be measured. Heart rate was also measured while 
inside the extreme haunt. 
State Anxiety 
 Shortly following the completion of the extreme haunt, participants completed a state anxiety measure. 
State anxiety was measured using Spielberger’s (1983) State Anxiety Inventory (SAI Form Y). The state anxiety inventory 
(SAI) is comprised of 20 items. State anxiety items assessing how participants felt while inside in the haunt were 
instructed to be interpreted in the past tense, such as: “I was tense; I was worried” and “I felt calm; I felt secure.” 
Each item is rated on a 4-point scale (e.g., almost never, sometimes, often, almost always). 
Sensation Seeking 
 Prior to beginning the extreme haunt, participants completed a sensation-seeking inventory. Sensation 
seeking was measured using Zuckerman’s (1994) Sensation-Seeking Scale (SSS Form V; see Appendix B). The SSS-V is 
comprised of 40 items and measures the following variables: Thrill and Adventure Seeking (TAS), Experience Seeking 
(ES), Disinhibition (DIS), and Boredom Susceptibility (BS). Each variable or subscale is comprised of 10 forced-choice 
items that contain two choices, A and B (scored as either high or low). 
Memory Measures 
 Thirty minutes after the extreme haunt, participants were prompted to answer a free recall of the simulated 
physical assault and cued recall of attributes of the actors encountered. Scoring for free recall was structured 
according to the procedure adopted by Yuille and Cutshall (1986). Statements were separated into three 
components: (a) person descriptions; (b) object descriptions; and (c) action details. Each detail was allotted one point 
if it contained a specific, unique piece of information. Information lacking specificity, was assigned a half point. Actions 
details consisted of verb and adverb phrases, while descriptive details were comprised of noun and adjective phrases. 
Following the practices of police questioning and work conducted by Yuille and Cutshall (1986), a questionnaire was 
designed to record cued recall of the actors encountered during the extreme haunt and included the following: sex, 
age, height, weight, eye color, hair color, and clothing. Details provided in the cued recall task focusing on the 
characteristics of the actors encountered were combined into a single score. Two judges rated each descriptor as 
28 
 
either correct or incorrect compared to the appearance of each actor, including clothing and masks. Each actor self-
reported their physical characteristics. Estimates were judged correct if height was ± 2 inches, age ± 2 years, weight 
was ± 5 pounds.2 Statements with qualifiers such as “might” or “maybe” were scored incorrect following procedures 
adopted by previous studies (e.g., Valentine & Mesout, 2009; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Disagreements were resolved 
by discussion. 
 Last, participants were presented a six-mask simultaneous photo lineup for each actor 45 minutes after 
their encounter. Unbiased instructions were used, and participants were instructed that “The person you saw in the 
haunt may or may not be in the lineup,” and “If you cannot make an identification you should say so.” After their 
response, each participant rated their level of confidence in their decision on a scale from 0 to 100. Photographs of 
Colombina masks were used to create a six-mask simultaneous lineup for each actor encountered. The foils most 
similar in appearance, matched on design, were selected from the photographs available. The foils were similar in 
design to the Colombina masks worn by the actors in each condition. Photographs were full-mask views, taken under 
similar conditions with the same background. 
Design 
Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and Heart Rate 
 Mean heart rate was recorded before and during the extreme haunt. Following the completion of the 
extreme haunt, participants completed the State Anxiety Inventory, reporting how they felt during the simulated 
physical assault that took place in the extreme haunt. Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and heart rate was assessed 
by correlation with state anxiety score and change in heart rate (M extreme haunt heart rate – M baseline heart rate). 
Eyewitness Performance 
 In examining the relationship between details recalled, and sex and state anxiety score, correlations were 
conducted. Multiple linear regression models were estimated to predict the number of correct and incorrect details 
recalled from free and cued recall. In separate analyses, correct, and incorrect details recalled were entered as 
criterion variables. The predictor variables entered for each multiple linear regression model were sex and state 
anxiety score. Multiple logistic regression models were estimated to predict identification accuracy from a six-mask 
 
2 Estimates were also judged correct if height was ± 3 inches, age ± 3 years, weight was ± 10 pounds. This alternate 
coding guideline was also intended to be reported on in the Results section, however, correlations examining the 
original guideline and this more relaxed guideline revealed rs > .90 for all estimate types. Thus, this relaxed coding 
variant was not included in the Results section as a comparison. 
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photograph array. Sex, state anxiety score, and confidence were entered as predictor variables for each multiple 
logistic regression model. Differences in anxiety and performance relating to the assailant and observer were 
assessed using Welch's t-test. 
Experiment 2 
Participants 
Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and Heart Rate 
 Fifty-five participants attending Hotel Fear (see below) contributed data to the analysis and had a mean age 
of 28.8 years (SD = 9.4, range 18-48 years); 27 were male, and 28 were female. 
Eyewitness Performance 
 Ninety-six participants attending Hotel Fear (see below) provided complete data that was analyzed. They 
had a mean age of 31.1 years (SD = 8.78, range 18-57 years); 38 were male, and 58 were female. A between-subjects 
design was used to conduct analyses for each culprit. For Control Culprit A, 26 participants provided complete data 
that was analyzed. They had a mean age of 28.8 years (SD = 7.68, range 18-49 years); 8 were male, and 18 were 
female. For Control Culprit B, 30 participants provided complete data that was analyzed. They had a mean age of 
32.7 years (SD = 9.31, range 19-57 years); 15 were male, and 15 were female. For the experimental culprit, 40 
participants provided complete data that was analyzed. They had a mean age of 31.7 years (SD = 9.0, range 18-57 
years); 15 were male, and 25 were female. 
Materials and Procedure 
Setting 
 Hotel Fear is a Las Vegas-based haunted house. Comprised of dark narrow hallways, unnerving rooms, 
frightening music, blood-curdling screams, and sadistic hotel staff, Hotel Fear is designed to provide participants with 
a variety of horrifying experiences. Informed consent was obtained before entering the haunted house, and 
participants were told that they would be answering questions related to their haunted house experience. 
Participants were admitted in groups of 4 to 6, and the experience lasted 10 minutes. Prior to going into the haunt, 
participants encountered an actor who gave detailed instructions of haunt rules during baseline (i.e., control culprit). 
As participants went through the haunted house, they encountered a maniacal actor (i.e., experimental culprit) who 





 Heart rate was measured as beats per minute (bpm) using a Polar OH1 wireless heart rate monitor. The 
wireless heart rate monitor was fitted to the participant’s forearm approximately 15 minutes prior to entering the 
haunted house, allowing for the average baseline heart rate to be measured during the encounter of the control 
culprit, and while inside the haunted house during the encounter of the experimental culprit. 
State Anxiety 
 As in Experiment 1, shortly following the completion of the haunted house, participants completed the state 
anxiety inventory. State anxiety was measured using Spielberger’s (1983) State Anxiety Inventory (SAI Form Y). 
Sensation Seeking 
 Prior to entering the haunted house, participants completed the Thrill and Adventure Seeking (TAS) 
subscale taken from Zuckerman’s (1994) Sensation-Seeking Scale (SSS Form V; see Appendix C). The Thrill and 
Adventure Seeking (TAS) subscale measures an individual’s desire to engage in unusual and intense experiences. The 
subscale is comprised of 10 forced-choice items that contain two choices A and B (scored as either high or low). 
Memory Measures 
 Ten minutes after the haunted house, participants were prompted to answer questionnaires designed to 
record free and cued recall for each culprit encountered. The scoring procedure for free and cued recall was the 
same as in Experiment 1.3 Last, participants were presented a simultaneous six-person photograph array for each 
culprit 30 minutes after their encounter. For Control Culprit A, a target-present lineup was presented, and for 
Control Culprit B and the experimental culprit, a target-absent lineup was presented. The reason for which there 
were not target-present lineups presented for Control Culprit B and the experimental culprit, will be discussed later. 
As in Experiment 1, unbiased instructions were used, and participants were instructed that “The person you saw in 
the haunt may or may not be in the lineup,” and “If you cannot make an identification you should say so.” After their 
response, each participant rated their level of confidence in their decision from 0 to 100 using an 11-point Likert 
scale. Photographs of other individuals were used to create a six-person photograph array for Control Culprit A. 
 
3 Estimates were also judged correct if height was ± 3 inches, age ± 3 years, weight was ± 10 pounds. This alternate 
coding guideline was also intended to be reported on in the Results section, however, correlations examining the 
original guideline and this more relaxed guideline revealed rs > .90 for all estimate types. Thus, this relaxed coding 
variant was not included in the Results section as a comparison. 
31 
 
The foils most similar in appearance, matched on sex, age, and ethnic origin were selected from the photographs 
available. Photographs were full-face views and were taken under similar conditions with the same background. 
Design 
Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and Heart Rate 
 Mean heart rate was recorded before and during the extreme haunt. Following the completion of the 
extreme haunt, participants completed the State Anxiety Inventory, reporting how they felt in the haunted house. 
Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and heart rate was assessed by correlation with state anxiety score and change 
in heart rate (M haunted house heart rate – M baseline heart rate). 
Eyewitness Performance 
 In examining the relationship between details recalled, and sex and state anxiety score, correlations were 
conducted. Multiple linear regression models were estimated to predict the number of details recalled. In separate 
analyses, correct and incorrect details recalled were entered as criterion variables. The predictor variables entered 
for each multiple linear regression model were sex and state anxiety score. Multiple logistic regression models were 
estimated to predict identification accuracy from a six-person photograph array. Sex, state anxiety score, and 
confidence were entered as predictor variables for each multiple logistic regression model. Differences in anxiety 
and performance relating to the assailant and observer were assessed using Welch's t-test and one-way analysis of 







Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and Heart Rate 
 
 Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and heart rate was assessed by correlation with state anxiety score and 
change in heart rate. Participants’ mean baseline heart rate was 94.3 bpm (SD = 14.6), and mean heart rate while in 
the extreme haunt was 123.3 bpm (SD = 23.0). Thus, mean heart rate was significantly higher in the extreme haunt, 
t(9) = 8.64, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.51, 95% CI [0.44, 2.57] (see Figure 3). Participant’s mean state anxiety score was 
49.3 (SD = 12.8). Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the change in heart rate (M extreme haunt heart rate – M baseline 
heart rate) and state anxiety score was significant, r(9) = .65, p = .041, 95% CI [0.04, 0.91] (see Figure 3). Visual inspection 
suggested an outlier; however, Mahalanobis distance revealed that a bivariate outlier was not present, ps > .001. 
Sensitivity testing indicated that the suspected bivariate outlier affected the significance of the correlation, but that 
















Simulated Physical Assault 
 Differences in state anxiety between female and male participants were assessed using Welch's t-test. 
Participants’ mean state anxiety score was 55.2 (SD = 13.2). There were no differences in state anxiety between 
female and male participants (53.9 vs. 56.5, respectively), t(13.70) = -0.39, p = .706, Cohen’s d = -0.19, 95% CI [-
1.27, 0.88]. 
 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from free recall of the simulated physical assault, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There were 
no significant associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number of correct details recalled and 
sex, r(14) = .06, p = .831, or state anxiety, r(14) = -.16, p = .567. There was no association between the number of 
incorrect details recalled and sex, r(14) = .17, p = .534, or state anxiety, r(14) = -.24, p = .382. 
 A multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled from 
free recall of the simulated physical assault (see Table 1). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety 
score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of correct details 
recalled, B = 1.77, t = .27, p = .790, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of correct details recalled, β = -.16, 
t = -0.59, p = .564.  
 A second multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from free recall of the simulated physical assault (see Table 1). The predictor variables entered were sex and state 
anxiety score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect 
details recalled, B = 0.87, t = 0.73, p = .478, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, 






Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Free Recall of Simulated Assault 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex  1.77 -12.28 15.82 6.50  .08  0.27 .790 
        
SAI -0.15  -0.70  0.40 0.25 -.16 -0.59 .564 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex  0.87 -1.70 3.43 1.19  .19  0.73 .478 
        
SAI -0.04 -0.14 0.06 0.05 -.25 -0.96 .356 
        
Note. a F(2, 13) = 0.20, p = .823, Adjusted R2 = -.120; b F(2, 13) = 0.66, p = .533, Adjusted R2 = -.047. B = unstandardized 





 Differences in state anxiety between female and male participants were assessed using Welch's t-test. 
Participants’ mean state anxiety score was 51.3 (SD = 13.4). There were no differences in state anxiety between 
female and male participants (51.9 vs. 50.9, respectively), t(18.03) = 0.18, p = .861, Cohen’s d = .08, 95% CI [-0.83, 
0.98]. 
 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from cued recall of the assailant, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There were no significant 
associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number of correct details recalled and sex, r(20) = .09, 
p = .681, or state anxiety, r(20) = -.09, p = .697. There was no association between the number of incorrect details 
recalled and sex, r(20) = .05, p = .818, or state anxiety, r(20) = -.40, p = .066.  
 A multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled from 
cued recall of the assailant (see Table 2). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety score. There 
were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of correct details recalled, B = 0.52, 
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t = 0.39, p = .699, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of correct details recalled, β = -.08, t = -0.37, p = 
.715. 
 A second multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from cued recall of the assailant (see Table 2). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety score. 
There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect details recalled, B 
= 0.06, t = 0.17, p = .865, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, β = -.40, t = -




Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Cued Recall of Assailant 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex  0.52 -2.25 3.28 1.32  .09  0.39 .699 
        
SAI -0.02 -0.12 0.09 0.05 -.08 -0.37 .715 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex  0.06 -0.66 0.78 0.35  .04  0.17 .865 
        
SAI -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -.40 -1.89 .074 
        
Note. a F(2, 19) = 0.15, p = .860, Adjusted R2 = -.088; b F(2, 19) = 1.82, p = .189, Adjusted R2 = .072. B = unstandardized 




 A multiple logistic regression model was estimated to predict the identification accuracy of the assailant 
from a simultaneous six-mask photograph array (see Table 3). The outcome of identification was divided into 
accurate (correct identification) and inaccurate (foil identification or no identification) for analysis, with sex, state 
anxiety score, and confidence entered as the predictor variables (Nagelkerke R2 = .270). There were no significant 
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effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2(1) = .00, p = .975, no effect of state 
anxiety on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2 (1) = .73, p = .394, and no effect of confidence on identification accuracy, 




Multiple Logistic Regression Results for Identification Accuracy of Assailant 
 
Variable B SE Wald χ2 (df) p OR 95% CI for OR 
 LL UL 
        
Sex  0.05 1.50 0.00 (1) .975 1.05 0.56 19.69 
        
SAI -0.06 0.07 0.73 (1) .394 0.94 0.81 1.09 
        
Confidence  0.07 0.05 1.84 (1) .175 1.07 0.97 1.17 
        
Note.  χ2(3) = 3.97, p = .264; Nagelkerke R2 = .270; Percentage Correct = 81.8%. B = unstandardized regression 




 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from cued recall of the observer, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There were no significant 
associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number of correct details recalled and sex, r(20) = -
.12, p = .598, or state anxiety, r(20) = -.16, p = .486. There was no association between the number of incorrect 
details recalled and sex, r(20) = .00, p = 1.00, or state anxiety, r(20) = -.31, p = .167. 
 A multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled from 
cued recall of the observer (see Table 4). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety score. There 
were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of correct details recalled, B = -0.39, 




 A second multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from cued recall of the observer (see Table 4). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety score. 
There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect details recalled, B 
= -0.02, t = -0.06, p = .957, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, β = -.31, t = -




Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Cued Recall of Observer 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex -0.39 -1.84 1.07 0.70 -.13 -0.56 .584 
        
SAI -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.03 -.16 -0.72 .481 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex -0.02 -0.76 0.72 0.35 -.01 -0.06 .957 
        
SAI -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.01 -.31 -1.40 .177 
        
Note. a F(2, 19) = 0.40, p = .677, Adjusted R2 = -.061; b F(2, 19) = 0.98, p = .393, Adjusted R2 = -.002. B = unstandardized 




 A multiple logistic regression model was estimated to predict the identification accuracy of the observer 
from a simultaneous six-mask photograph array (see Table 5). The outcome of identification was divided into 
accurate (correct identification) and inaccurate (foil identification or no identification) for analysis, with sex, state 
anxiety score, and confidence entered as the predictor variables (Nagelkerke R2 = .547). There was an effect of 
confidence on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2(1) = 4.05, p = .044. Thus, post-identification confidence was a reliable 
predictor of identification accuracy for the observer. There were no other significant effects, ps > .05. There was no 
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effect of sex on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2(1) = .01, p = .936, no effect of state anxiety on identification 




Multiple Logistic Regression Results for Identification Accuracy of Observer 
 
Variable B SE Wald χ2 (df) p OR 95% CI for OR 
 LL UL 
        
Sex  0.14 1.70 0.01 (1) .936 1.15 0.04 32.31 
        
SAI -0.06 0.09 0.41 (1) .520 0.95 0.78  1.12 
        
Confidence  0.07 0.04 4.05 (1) .044 1.08 1.00  1.16 
        
Note.  χ2(3) = 8.99, p = .029; Nagelkerke R2 = .547; Percentage Correct = 86.4%. B = unstandardized regression 
coefficients; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
 
 
Comparison of Details Reported and Identification Accuracy Between Assailant and Observer 
 
 In examining the differences between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled from cued recall 
of the assailant and observer, paired sample t-tests were conducted. There were significantly more correct details 
recalled of the assailant (M = 6.82, SD = 2.92) than the observer (M = 3.23, SD = 1.57), t(21) = 6.72, p < .001. There 
was no significant difference in the number of incorrect details recalled for the assailant (M = 1.27, SD = .83) and 
observer (M = 1.00, SD = .82), t(21) = 1.19, p = .248. In examining identification accuracy between the assailant and 













   
Correct Identification 4 4 
   
Foil Identification 17 11 
   
False Rejection 1 4 
   
Don’t Know Response 0 3 




Sensation Seeking Among Extreme Haunt Attendees 
 The relationship of sensation seeking and participation in extreme haunts are shown in Tables 7 and 8. For 
these participants, the mean of the Experience Seeking (ES) subscale of the SSS-V was near the ceiling of the 0-10 
scale: M = 8.09, SD = 1.72, Median = 8.50. Even in the absence of a normative reference population, this suggests 
substantial selection bias. The comparison of mean SSS-V scores of extreme haunt attendees and other groups are 
shown in Table 9. Extreme haunt attendees had the highest score on the Disinhibition (DIS) subscale. Additionally, 
this group and expedition climbers had the highest scores on the ES subscale. There were no significant differences 








Descriptive Statistics for Sensation Seeking Scale Scores of Extreme Haunt Attendees 
 
Statistic TAS ES DIS BS Total 
      
M 5.50 8.09 6.68 3.27 23.55 
      
Median 6.00 8.50 7.00 4.00 26.00 
      
SD 3.26 1.72 1.89 1.98 6.70 
      
Minimum 0.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 5.00 
      
Maximum 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.00 33.00 
      
Range 10.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 28.00 
      
Note. N = 22. TAS = Thrill and Adventure Seeking Subscale; ES = Experience Seeking Subscale; DIS = Disinhibition 





Mean Sensation Seeking Scale Scores of Extreme Haunt Attendees by Sex 
 
Sex TAS ES DIS BS Total 
      
Male 6.08 8.08 6.62 3.77 24.54 
      
Female 4.67 8.11 6.78 2.56 22.11 
      
Note. N = 22; Male (n = 13); Female (n = 9). TAS = Thrill and Adventure Seeking Subscale; ES = Experience Seeking 









Mean Sensation Seeking Scale Scores of Extreme Haunt Attendees and Other Groups 
 
Group N TAS ES DIS BS Total 
       
Expedition climbers 9 9.11 8.55 5.88 5.11 28.66 
       
Parachutists/skydivers 20 8.75 6.85 6.50 4.55 26.65 
       
Elite mountain climbers 36 8.25 7.58 5.91 3.55 25.30 
       
White water canoeists  32 8.78 6.44 5.59 4.03 24.78 
       
Extreme haunt attendees 22 5.50 8.09 6.68 3.27 23.55 
       
Karate, males 17 8.00 4.82 5.65 3.82 22.29 
       
Karate, females 14 7.50 5.64 5.29 3.79 22.22 
       
Physical education students, males  43 7.79 5.44 5.37 3.49 22.09 
       
North Sea divers 5 7.80 5.00 4.40 4.80 22.00 
       
Ice-hockey players 19 7.11 4.58 5.68 4.58 21.95 
       
Teachers, males  12 4.83 6.50 6.25 3.83 21.41 
       
Tennis players, males 5 7.60 5.20 6.40 1.80 21.00 
       
Military recruits 28 6.61 4.75 5.82 3.71 20.89 
       
Volleyball players, males 13 5.15 4.00 4.92 4.38 18.46 
       
Volleyball players, females 16 5.44 5.31 4.00 2.44 17.19 
       
Teachers, females 17 3.88 5.25 2.50 2.75 14.38 
      
Note. TAS = Thrill and Adventure Seeking Subscale; ES = Experience Seeking Subscale; DIS = Disinhibition Subscale; 
BS = Boredom Susceptibility Subscale. Groups are placed in order of mean scores on the Sensation Seeking Scale 
Total. Other groups are reported from Breivik (1991), unpublished raw data. In Zuckerman (2007). Copyright 2007 




 In Experiment 1, the Science of HVRTING was successful in inducing physiological arousal, given the 
significant increase in heart rate in the relation group. Furthermore, the relation of State Anxiety Inventory and heart 
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rate was established with Pearson’s correlation coefficient between state anxiety score and change in heart rate. 
State anxiety scores for participants in the experiment were higher (M = 49.3) for both males (M = 54.8) and females 
(M = 45.7) when compared to normative data for working adults aged 19-39 (36.5 for males, 36.2 for females), 40-
49 (35.9 for males, 36.0 for females), and 50-69 (34.5 for males, 32.2 for females; Spielberger, 1983). These data 
show that state anxiety score was higher when compared to normative data and that the Science of HVRTING 
induced physiological activation, as well as an impressionistic experience of anxiety. There was no difference in state 
anxiety between females and males, but if anything, the pattern suggested that females may have slightly lower state 
anxiety when compared to males. While females, on average, score higher than males on anxiety (e.g., Spielberger, 
1983), these data are not consistent with that finding. Furthermore, these data are not consistent with previous 
research showing that females reported higher state anxiety under similar stressful conditions when compared to 
males (e.g., Valentine & Mesout, 2009). 
 There was no effect of state anxiety on eyewitness recall or identification accuracy. Additionally, there was 
no effect of sex on eyewitness recall or identification accuracy. When assessing confidence and accuracy, it was 
found that post-identification confidence was a reliable predictor of identification accuracy for the observer, but not 
the assailant.  
 As predicted, when examining differences in eyewitness recall of each culprit, there were significantly more 
correct details recalled from cued recall of the assailant than the observer. However, there was no significant 
difference in the number of incorrect details recalled of the assailant when compared to the observer. Furthermore, 
when examining differences in identification accuracy between culprits, there was no significant difference in the 
number of correct identifications made of the assailant when compared to the observer. 
 Overall, Experiment 1 demonstrated that physiological and psychological measures of arousal were 
associated. However, the experience of stress in a naturalistic environment did not result in a catastrophic effect on 
eyewitness recall or identification accuracy. In Experiment 2, a similar design was used as that shown in Experiment 









Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and Heart Rate 
 
 Relation of State Anxiety Inventory and heart rate was assessed by correlation with state anxiety score and 
change in heart rate. Participants’ mean baseline heart rate was 94.1 bpm (SD = 14.7), and mean heart rate while in 
the haunted house was 105.0 bpm (SD = 19.5). Thus, mean heart rate was significantly higher in the haunted house, 
t(54) = 9.68, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.63, 95% CI [0.25, 1.02] (see Figure 4). Participant’s mean state anxiety score 
was 43.2 (SD = 13.3). Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the change in heart rate (M haunted house heart rate – M 












Control Culprit A 
 
 Differences in state anxiety between female and male participants were assessed using Welch’s t-test. 
Participants’ mean state anxiety score was 39.85 (SD = 10.0). There was no difference in state anxiety between 




 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from free recall of the control culprit, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There was a moderate 
negative association between the number of correct details recalled and sex, r(24) = -.47, p = .016. Females recalled 
more correct details when compared to males, t(21.18) = 2.78, p = .011, Cohen’s d = 0.98, 95% CI [0.06, 1.90]. 
There were no other significant associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number of correct 
details recalled and state anxiety, r(24) = .07, p = .728. There was no association between the number of incorrect 
details recalled and sex, r(24) = -.23, p = .268, or state anxiety, r(24) = .14, p = .510. 
 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from cued recall of the control culprit, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There were no 
significant associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number of correct details recalled and sex, 
r(24) = -.15, p = .469, or state anxiety, r(24) = -.32, p = .114. There was no association between the number of 
incorrect details recalled and sex, r(24) = .04, p = .860, or state anxiety, r(24) = .27, p = .187. 
 A multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled from 
free recall of the control culprit (see Table 10). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety score. 
There was an effect of sex on the number of correct details recalled, B = -2.58, t = -2.51, p = .019. As previously 
stated, females recalled more correct details when compared to males. There were no other significant effects, ps > 
.05. There was no effect of state anxiety on the number of correct details recalled, β = .03, t = 0.13, p = .894. 
 A second multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from free recall of the control culprit (see Table 10). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety 
score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect details 
recalled, B = -0.21, t = -1.06,  p = .302, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, β 





Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Free Recall of Control Culprit A 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex -2.58 -0.21 8.24 1.03 -.47 -2.51 .019 
        
SAI  0.01 -0.09 0.11 0.05  .03  0.13 .894 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex -0.21 -0.82 0.83 0.20 -.21 -1.06 .302 
        
SAI  0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01  .11  0.56 .580 
        
Note. a F(2, 23) = 3.24, p = .058, Adjusted R2 = .152; b F(2, 23) = 0.78, p = .470, Adjusted R2 = -.018. B = unstandardized 




 A third multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled 
from cued recall of the control culprit (see Table 11). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety 
score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of correct details 
recalled, B = -0.85, t = -0.93,  p = .360, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of correct details recalled, β = 
-.34, t = -1.72, p = .098. 
 A fourth multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from cued recall of the control culprit (see Table 11). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety 
score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect details 
recalled, B = 0.20, t = 0.32,  p = .754, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, β = 





Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Cued Recall of Control Culprit A 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex -0.85 -2.74 1.04 0.91 -.18 -0.93 .360 
        
SAI -0.07 -0.16 0.02 0.04 -.34 -1.72 .098 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex  0.20 -1.08 1.47 0.62  .06  0.32 .754 
        
SAI  0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.03  .27  1.36 .188 
        
Note. a F(2, 23) = 1.78, p = .192, Adjusted R2 = .059; b F(2, 23) = 0.94, p = .406, Adjusted R2 = -.005. B = unstandardized 




 A multiple logistic regression model was estimated to predict the identification accuracy of the control 
culprit from a target-present simultaneous six-person photograph array (see Table 12). The outcome of identification 
was divided into accurate (correct identification) and inaccurate (foil identification or no identification) for analysis, 
with state anxiety score and confidence entered as the predictor variables (Nagelkerke R2 = .359). There were no 
significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of state anxiety on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2(1) = 1.98, p = 
.159, and no effect of confidence on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2(1) = 2.61, p = .106. Sex was initially entered 
as a predictor variable in the multiple logistic regression model; however, due to a quasi-complete separation, sex 
was investigated separately. Additional statistical analysis confirmed that there was no effect of sex on identification 






Multiple Logistic Regression Results for Identification Accuracy of Control Culprit A 
 
Variable B SE Wald χ2 (df) p OR 95% CI for OR 
 LL UL 
        
SAI -0.91 0.07 1.98 (1) .159 0.91 0.80 1.04 
        
Confidence  0.27 0.17 2.61 (1) .106 1.03 0.99 1.06 
        
Note. χ2(2) = 7.03, p = .030; Nagelkerke R2 = .359; Percentage Correct = 84.60%. B = unstandardized regression 
coefficients; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
 
 
Control Culprit B 
 
 Differences in state anxiety between female and male participants were assessed using Welch’s t-test. 
Participants’ mean state anxiety score was 41.1 (SD = 15.6). There was no difference in state anxiety between female 
and male participants (43.9 vs. 38.2, respectively), t(27.37) = 1.01, p = .322, Cohen’s d = 0.37, 95% CI [-0.39, 1.12]. 
 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from free recall of the control culprit, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There were no 
significant associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number of correct details recalled and sex, 
r(28) = .02, p = .915, or state anxiety, r(28) = .03, p = .870. There was no association between the number of 
incorrect details recalled and sex, r(28) = .00, p = 1.00, or state anxiety, r(28) = .19, p = .312. 
 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from cued recall of the control culprit, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There was a moderate 
negative association between the number of correct details recalled and state anxiety, r(28) = -.43, p = .017. 
Participants higher in state anxiety recalled fewer correct details from cued recall when compared to those lower 
in state anxiety. There were no other significant associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number 
of correct details recalled and sex, r(28) = .21, p = .270. There was no association between the number of incorrect 
details recalled and sex, r(28) = -.05, p = .781, or state anxiety, r(28) = .08, p = .664. 
 A multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled from 
free recall of the control culprit (see Table 13). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety score. 
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There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of correct details recalled, B 
= 0.18, t = 0.14, p = .890, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of correct details recalled, β = .04, t = 0.19, 
p = .854. 
 A second multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from free recall of the control culprit (see Table 13). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety 
score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect details 
recalled, B = 0.02, t = 0.19, p = .848, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, β = 




Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Free Recall of Control Culprit B 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex 0.18 -2.44 2.80 1.28 .03 0.14 .890 
        
SAI 0.01 -0.08 0.09 0.04 .04 0.19 .854 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex 0.02 -0.18 0.22 0.10 .04 0.19 .848 
        
SAI 0.00  0.00 0.01 0.00 .20 1.03 .312 
        
Note. a F(2, 27) = 0.02, p = .977, Adjusted R2 = -.072; b F(2, 27) = 0.53, p = .594, Adjusted R2 = -.033. B = unstandardized 




 A third multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled 
from cued recall of the control culprit (see Table 14). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety 
score. There was a significant effect of state anxiety on the number of correct details recalled, β = -.41, t = -2.32, p 
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= .028. Participants higher in state anxiety recalled fewer correct details from cued recall when compared to those 
lower in state anxiety. There were no other significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number 
of correct details recalled, B = 0.55, t = 0.75, p = .458. 
 A fourth multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from cued recall of the control culprit (see Table 14). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety 
score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect details 
recalled, B = -0.10, t = -0.20, p = .844, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, β = 




Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Cued Recall of Control Culprit B 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex  0.55 -0.95  2.05 0.73  .13  0.75 .458 
        
SAI -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 -.41 -2.32 .028 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex -0.10 -1.11  0.91 0.49 -.04 -0.20 .844 
        
SAI  0.01 -0.03  0.04 0.02  .08  0.39 .702 
        
Note. a F(2, 27) = 3.43, p = .047, Adjusted R2 = .143; b F(2, 27) = 0.11, p = .894, Adjusted R2 = -.065. B = unstandardized 




 A multiple logistic regression model was estimated to predict the identification accuracy of the control 
culprit from a target-absent simultaneous six-person photograph array (see Table 15). The outcome of identification 
was divided into accurate (rejection of lineup) and inaccurate (foil identification) for analysis, with sex, state anxiety 
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score, and confidence entered as the predictor variables (Nagelkerke R2 = .627). Post-identification confidence was 
associated with a correct rejection of the lineup, Wald’s χ2(1) = 5.82, p = .016. There were no other significant 
effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2(1) = 1.71, p = .191, and no effect 





Multiple Logistic Regression Results for Identification Accuracy of Control Culprit B 
 
Variable B SE Wald χ2 (df) p OR 95% CI for OR 
 LL UL 
        
Sex -2.43 1.86 1.71 (1) .191 0.09 0.00 3.36 
        
SAI -0.54 0.05 1.41 (1) .235 0.95 0.87 1.04 
        
Confidence  0.07 0.03 5.82 (1) .016 1.07 1.01 1.13 
        
Note. χ2(3) = 15.15, p = .002; Nagelkerke R2 = .627; Percentage Correct = 86.70%. B = unstandardized regression 





 Differences in state anxiety between female and male participants were assessed using Welch’s t-test. 
Participants’ mean state anxiety score was 42.4 (SD = 13.6). There was no difference in state anxiety between female 
and male participants (39.2 vs. 44.3, respectively), t(33.21) = 1.19, p = .241, Cohen’s d = 0.37, 95% CI [-0.29, 1.04]. 
 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from free recall of the experimental culprit, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There were no 
significant associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number of correct details recalled and sex, 
r(38) = .20, p = .220, or state anxiety, r(38) = -.09, p = .586. There was no association between the number of 
incorrect details recalled and sex, r(38) = .30, p = .064, or state anxiety, r(38) = .07, p = .666. 
 Separate correlations between the number of correct and incorrect details recalled by each participant 
from cued recall of the experimental culprit, and their sex and state anxiety score were conducted. There were no 
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significant associations, ps > .05. There was no association between the number of correct details recalled and sex, 
r(38) = -.06, p = .736, or state anxiety, r(38) = .31, p = .054. There was no association between the number of 
incorrect details recalled and sex, r(38) = .23, p = .153, or state anxiety, r(38) = -.18, p = .262. 
 A multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled from 
free recall of the experimental culprit (see Table 16). The predictor variables entered were sex and state anxiety 
score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of correct details 
recalled, B = 0.41, t = 1.15, p = .257, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of correct details recalled, β = 
.19, t = -0.33, p = .742. 
 A second multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from free recall of the experimental culprit (see Table 16). The predictor variables entered were sex and state 
anxiety. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect details 
recalled, B = 0.14, t = 2.02, p = .051, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, β = 




Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Free Recall of Experimental Culprit 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex 0.41 -0.75 1.72 0.36  .19  1.15 .257 
        
SAI 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -.05 -0.33 .742 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex 0.14 0.00 0.29 0.07  .32  2.02 .051 
        
SAI 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00  .13  0.82 .420 
        
Note. a F(2, 37) = 0.82, p = .450, Adjusted R2 = -.010; b F(2, 37) = 2.14, p = .132, Adjusted R2 = .055. B = unstandardized 




 A third multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of correct details recalled 
from cued recall of the experimental culprit (see Table 17). The predictor variables entered were sex and state 
anxiety score. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of correct details 
recalled, B = 0.00, t = 0.01, p = .994, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of correct details recalled, β = 
.31, t = 1.93, p = .061. 
 A fourth multiple linear regression model was estimated to predict the number of incorrect details recalled 
from cued recall of the experimental culprit (see Table 17). The predictor variables entered were sex and state 
anxiety. There were no significant effects, ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on the number of incorrect details 
recalled, B = 0.60, t = 1.27, p = .213, and no effect of state anxiety on the number of incorrect details recalled, β = 




Multiple Linear Regression Results for Details Reported from Cued Recall of Experimental Culprit 
 
Variable B 95% CI for B SE β t p 
  LL UL     
        
Number of Correct Details a 
 
Sex  0.00 -1.09 1.10 0.54  .00  0.01 .994 
        
SAI  0.04  0.00 0.08 0.02  .31  1.93 .061 
        
 
Number of Incorrect Details b 
 
Sex  0.60 -0.36 1.57 0.48  .20  1.27 .213 
        
SAI -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.02 -.14 -0.90 .376 
        
Note. a F(2, 37) = 1.93, p = .160, Adjusted R2 = .045; b F(2, 37) = 1.46, p = .245, Adjusted R2 = .023. B = unstandardized 






 A multiple logistic regression model was estimated to predict the identification accuracy of the experimental 
culprit from a target-absent simultaneous six-person photograph array (see Table 18). The outcome of identification 
was divided into accurate (rejection of lineup) and inaccurate (foil identification) for analysis, with sex, state anxiety 
score, and confidence entered as the predictor variables (Nagelkerke R2 = .006). There were no significant effects, 
ps > .05. There was no effect of sex on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2(1) = 0.43, p = .705, no effect of state anxiety 
on identification accuracy, Wald’s χ2(1) = 0.08, p = .778, and no effect of confidence on identification accuracy, Wald’s 





Multiple Logistic Regression Results for Identification Accuracy of Experimental Culprit 
 
Variable B SE Wald χ2 (df) p OR 95% CI for OR 
 LL UL 
        
Sex -0.25 0.67 0.43 (1) .705 0.78 0.21 2.89 
        
SAI -0.01 0.02 0.08 (1) .778 0.99 0.95 1.04 
        
Confidence -0.00 0.01 0.00 (1) .948 0.99 0.98 1.02 
        
Note. χ2(3) = .19, p = .979; Nagelkerke R2 = .006; Percentage Correct = 52.50%. B = unstandardized regression 
coefficients; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
 
 
Comparison of Details Reported and Identification Accuracy Across Culprits 
 
 In examining the differences between the number of correct details recalled from free recall of the control 
culprits and experimental culprit, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant effect of culprit class 
on the number of correct details recalled, F(2, 93) = 18.02, p < .001. The assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was violated; therefore, Welch’s F-ratio is reported, F(2, 41.87), p < .001. Homogeneity could not be assumed 
between culprits; therefore, a Games-Howell post hoc test was conducted (see Table 19). These tests revealed 
significant differences between the experimental culprit, and both Control Culprit A, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -1.65, 
95% CI [-2.22, -1.07], and Control Culprit B, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -1.27, 95% CI [-1.80, -0.74]. Participants recalled 
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more correct details from free recall of the control culprits when compared to the experimental culprit. There were 
no significant differences between control culprits, p = .994, Cohen’s d = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.51, 0.56]. 
 In examining the differences between the number of incorrect details recalled from free recall of the control 
culprits and experimental culprit, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. There were no statistically significant 
differences between culprit class means, F(2, 93) = 0.93, p = .400. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
violated; therefore, Welch’s F-ratio is reported, F(2, 50.01), p = .574. Thus, there were no statistically significant 





Games-Howell Post-Hoc Analysis of Correct Details Reported from Free Recall Across Culprits 
 
Culprit Culprits MD 95% CI for MD SE p 
   LL UL   
       
Control Culprit A Control Culprit B  0.08 -1.83  1.99 0.79 .994 
 Experimental Culprit  3.02  1.69  4.34 0.54 .000 
       
Control Culprit B Control Culprit A -0.08 -1.99  1.83 0.79 .994 
 Experimental Culprit  2.94  1.40  4.48 0.63 .000 
       
Experimental Culprit Control Culprit A -3.02 -4.34 -1.69 0.54 .000 
 Control Culprit B -2.94 -4.48 -1.40 0.63 .000 
       
Note. MD = mean difference; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
 
 
 In examining the differences between the number of correct details recalled from cued recall of the control 
culprits and experimental culprit, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. There was a significant effect of culprit class 
on the number of correct details recalled, F(2, 93) = 13.01, p < .001. The assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was not violated. Homogeneity could be assumed between culprits; therefore, a Gabriel post hoc test was conducted 
(see Table 20). These tests revealed significant differences between the experimental culprit, and both Control 
Culprit A, p = .014, Cohen’s d = -0.76, 95% CI [-1.27, -0.24], and Control Culprit B, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -1.27, 
95% CI [-1.80, -0.75]. Participants recalled more correct details from cued recall of the control culprits when 
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compared to the experimental culprit. There were no significant differences between control culprits, p = .204, 
Cohen’s d = -0.44, 95% CI [-0.98, 0.10].  
 In examining the differences between the number of incorrect details recalled from cued recall of the 
control culprits and experimental culprit, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. There were no statistically significant 
differences between culprit class means, F(2, 93) = 2.86, p = .062. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
not violated. Thus, there were no statistically significant differences in the number of incorrect details recalled from 





Gabriel Post-Hoc Analysis of Correct Details Reported from Cued Recall Across Culprits 
 
Culprit Culprits MD 95% CI for MD SE p 
   LL UL   
       
Control Culprit A Control Culprit B -0.95 -2.23  0.33 0.53 .204 
 Experimental Culprit  1.43  0.23  2.63 0.50 .014 
       
Control Culprit B Control Culprit A  0.95 -0.33  2.23 0.53 .204 
 Experimental Culprit  2.38  1.23  3.53 0.47 .000 
       
Experimental Culprit Control Culprit A -1.43 -2.63 -0.23 0.50 .014 
 Control Culprit B -2.38 -3.53 -1.23 0.47 .000 
       
Note. MD = mean difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
 
 
 In examining the differences in identification accuracy between the control culprits and experimental culprit 
(see Table 21), a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The outcome of attempted identification was coded as accurate 
(1) or inaccurate (0) for each culprit. Only target-present lineups were presented for Control Culprit A. Thus, 
correct identifications were coded as accurate, while foil identifications and no identifications were coded as 
inaccurate. Only target-absent lineups were used for Control Culprit B and the experimental culprit. Thus, lineup 
rejections were coded as accurate, while foil identifications were coded as inaccurate. There was a significant effect 
of culprit class on identification accuracy, F(2, 93) = 4.59, p = .013. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
violated; therefore, Welch’s F-ratio is reported. There was a significant effect of culprit class on identification 
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accuracy, F(2, 47.78), p < .001. Homogeneity could not be assumed between culprit groups; therefore, Games-
Howell post hoc tests were conducted (see Table 22). These tests revealed significant differences between Control 
Culprit B and the experimental culprit, p = .021, Cohen’s d =  0.64, 95% CI [0.16, 1.13]. Participants made more 
correct rejections of the target-absent lineup for Control Culprit B when compared to the experimental culprit. 
There were no significant differences between control culprits, p = .960, Cohen’s d = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.60, 0.45], 





Identification Outcomes for Control and Experimental Culprits 
 
Target Presence Culprit Decision Type Outcome 
    
Target-Present Control A Correct Identification 20 
    
  Foil Identification 3 
    
  No Identification 3 
    
    
Target-Absent Control B Rejection of Lineup 24 
    
  Foil Identification 6 
    
    
Target-Absent Experimental Rejection of Lineup 20 
    
  Foil Identification 20 








Gabriel Post-Hoc Analysis of Identification Accuracy Across Culprits 
 
Culprit Culprits MD 95% CI for MD SE p 
   LL UL   
       
Control Culprit A Control Culprit B -0.03 -0.30  0.24 0.11 .960 
 Experimental Culprit  0.27 -0.01  0.55 0.12 .061 
       
Control Culprit B Control Culprit A  0.03 -0.24  0.30 0.11 .960 
 Experimental Culprit  0.30  0.04  0.56 0.11 .021 
       
Experimental Culprit Control Culprit A -0.27 -0.55  0.01 0.12 .061 
 Control Culprit B -0.30 -0.56 -0.04 0.11 .021 
       
Note. MD = mean difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
 
 
Sensation Seeking Among Haunted House Attendees  
 
 The relationship of thrill and adventure seeking (TAS) to participation in haunted houses is shown in Tables 
23 and 24. The comparison of mean TAS scores of haunted house attendees and other groups are shown in Table 
25. Haunted house attendees had relatively low TAS scores when compared to other groups and were comparable 
to the values reported in Experiment 1. Thrill and adventure seeking was significantly higher for males when 




Descriptive Statistics for Thrill and Adventure Seeking Scores of Haunted House Attendees 
 
Subscale M Median SD Minimum Maximum Range 
       
TAS 5.26 5.00 2.92 0.00 10.00 10.00 
       








Mean Thrill and Adventure Seeking Scores of Haunted House Attendees by Sex 
 
Subscale M Median SD Minimum Maximum Range 
       
Male 6.00 2.79 0.38 0.00 10.00 10.00 
       
Female 4.76 2.92 0.45 0.00 10.00 10.00 
       







Mean Thrill and Adventure Seeking Scores of Haunted House Attendees and Other Groups 
 
 
Group n TAS 
   
Expedition climbers 9 9.11 
   
Parachutists/skydivers 20 8.75 
   
Elite mountain climbers 36 8.25 
   
White water canoeists  32 8.78 
   
Karate, males 17 8.00 
   
Karate, females 14 7.50 
   
Physical education students, males  43 7.79 
   
North Sea divers 5 7.80 
   
Ice-hockey players 19 7.11 
   
Teachers, males  12 4.83 
   
Tennis players, males 5 7.60 
   
Military recruits 28 6.61 
   
Haunted house attendees 96 5.26 
   
Volleyball players, males 13 5.15 
   
Volleyball players, females 16 5.44 
   
Teachers, females 17 3.88 
   
Note. TAS = Thrill and Adventure Seeking Subscale. Groups are placed in order of mean scores on the TAS. Other 
groups are reported from Breivik (1991), unpublished raw data. In Zuckerman (2007). Copyright 2007 by the 





 In Experiment 2, Hotel Fear was successful in inducing physiological arousal, given the significant increase in 
heart rate in the relation group. However, unlike Experiment 1, relation of State Anxiety Inventory and heart rate 
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was not established with Pearson’s correlation coefficient between state anxiety score and the change in heart rate. 
State anxiety scores for participants in the study were higher (M = 43.2) for both males (M = 39.1) and females (M 
= 47.2) when compared to normative data for working adults aged 19-39 (36.5 for males, 36.2 for females), 40-49 
(35.9 for males, 36.0 for females; Spielberger, 1983). These data show that state anxiety scores were higher when 
compared to normative data and that Hotel Fear induced physiological activation, as well as an impressionistic 
experience of anxiety. There was a significant difference in state anxiety between females and males in the relation 
group, with females having reported significantly higher state anxiety when compared to males. This effect is 
consistent with previous research showing that females, on average, score higher than males on anxiety (e.g., 
Spielberger, 1983). However, this effect was not consistent outside the relation group. 
 Apart from participants higher in state anxiety recalling fewer correct details from cued recall of Control 
Culprit B when compared to participants lower in state anxiety, there was no consistent effect of state anxiety on 
eyewitness recall. Furthermore, there was no effect of state anxiety on identification accuracy. Apart from females 
recalling significantly more correct details from cued recall of Control Culprit A when compared to males, there 
was no consistent effect of sex on eyewitness recall. Additionally, there was no effect of sex on identification 
accuracy. In assessing confidence and identification accuracy, post-identification confidence was a reliable predictor 
of identification accuracy in the form of a correct rejection of the target-absent lineup for Control Culprit B; 
however, this effect was not consistent across culprits. 
 As predicted, in examining differences in eyewitness recall across culprits, there were significantly more 
correct details recalled from both free and cued recall of Control Culprits A and B when compared to the 
experimental culprit. However, there was no significant difference in the number of incorrect details recalled from 
both free and cued recall of Control Culprits A and B when compared to the experimental culprit. Furthermore, 
when examining differences in identification accuracy across culprits, participants were more accurate when 
correctly rejecting the lineup for Control Culprit B when compared to the experimental culprit. 
 Overall, Experiment 2 did not demonstrate that physiological and psychological measures of arousal were 
associated. However, the experience of stress in a naturalistic environment did not result in a catastrophic effect on 
eyewitness recall or identification accuracy. These data suggest that stress has minimal or no effect on eyewitness 




VII. General Discussion 
 The pattern of results from Experiments 1 and 2 are mixed and, ultimately, somewhat different from 
previous research in eyewitness literature examining the effects of stress in naturalistic environments. The study 
showed that each setting was successful in inducing physiological arousal, given the significant increase in heart rate 
in the relation groups. Data from the relation groups across the study showed that state anxiety scores were higher 
when compared to normative data and that both the Science of HVRTING and Hotel Fear induced physiological 
activation, as well as an impressionistic experience of anxiety. However, relation of State Anxiety Inventory and 
heart rate was only established in Experiment 1. Thus, it was found that physiological and psychological measures of 
arousal were associated for extreme haunt attendees but not haunted house attendees. While there was a significant 
difference in state anxiety between females and males in the relation group in Experiment 2, with females having 
reported significantly higher state anxiety when compared to males, this effect was not consistent across the study. 
Thus, apart from the relation group in Experiment 2, these data are not consistent with previous research showing 
that females, on average, score higher than males on anxiety (e.g., Spielberger, 1983). 
 Apart from participants higher in state anxiety recalling fewer correct details from cued recall of Control 
Culprit B in Experiment 2 when compared to participants lower in state anxiety, the study showed that there was 
no effect of state anxiety on eyewitness recall. Furthermore, the study showed that there was no effect of state 
anxiety on identification accuracy. Thus, participants who were higher in state anxiety did not recall fewer correct 
details, recall more incorrect details, or make fewer correct identifications when compared to participants lower in 
state anxiety — a finding that is in stark contrast to findings from previous field studies (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004; 
Valentine & Mesout, 2009). Apart from females recalling significantly more correct details from free recall of Control 
Culprit A when compared to males, the study showed that there was no consistent effect of state anxiety on 
eyewitness recall. Additionally, there was no effect of sex on identification accuracy. In assessing confidence and 
identification accuracy, post-identification confidence was not a reliable predictor of identification accuracy, except 
for Control Culprit B in Experiment 2. 
 Though stress had no effect on identification accuracy, previous studies have shown that participants higher 
in state anxiety or in a high-stress condition made fewer correct identifications when compared to participants lower 
in state anxiety or in a low-stress condition (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004; Valentine & Mesout, 2009). However, given 
the experimental designs of these previous studies, the difference in results could stem from the dichotomization of 
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continuous measures or having deprivations potentially play a role in shaping the data. When assessing confidence 
and accuracy, it was predicted that post-identification confidence would be a reliable predictor of identification 
accuracy. However, the findings throughout the study are mixed in that, post-identification confidence was a reliable 
predictor of identification accuracy for the observer, but not the assailant in Experiment 1, and for Control Culprit 
B, but not the other culprits in Experiment 2. Thus, post-identification confidence as a reliable predictor of 
identification accuracy was not a consistent finding throughout the study. While there exists a stark contrast between 
the strong confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship typically found in laboratory studies and the CA relationship in the 
real world, this finding is consistent with some previous research (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004) but contradictory to 
other research (e.g., Valentine & Mesout, 2009). 
 In Experiment 1, it was predicted that participants would recall more correct details, recall fewer incorrect 
details, and make more correct identifications of the assailant when compared to the observer. While there were 
no significant differences in the number of incorrect details recalled or correct identifications made of the assailant 
than the observer, there were significantly more correct details recalled of the assailant than the observer. This 
finding is consistent with previous research showing that stress can assist memory for central details of an event and 
impair recall of peripheral details (e.g., Reisburg & Heuer, 2007), as well as the Easterbrook hypothesis (1959) which 
states that under stressful conditions, there is a narrowing of attention specific to the central details of an event and 
that the narrowing of attention to central details comes at the expense of peripheral details. 
 In Experiment 2, it was predicted that participants would recall more correct details, recall fewer incorrect 
details, and make more correct identifications of the control culprits encountered prior to entering the haunted 
house when compared to the experimental culprit encountered while in the haunted house.  
While there was no significant difference in the number of incorrect details recalled for Control Culprits A and B 
when compared to the experimental culprit, participants recalled significantly more correct details for Control 
Culprits A and B when compared to the experimental culprit. Additionally, participants made more correct rejections 
of the target-absent lineup for Control Culprit B when compared to the experimental culprit. Though not significant, 
mean state anxiety was higher for participants who encountered the experimental culprit when compared to 
participants who encountered the control culprits. Recall for correct details was greater for the control culprits 
when compared to the experimental culprit, possibly due to previous work showing that participants high in 
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physiological arousal and cognitive stress perform worse than participants low in physiological arousal and cognitive 
stress (Valentine & Mesout, 2009). 
 Finally, overall sensation seeking was relatively high among extreme haunt attendees when compared to a 
variety of comparison groups, including Norwegian elite and team athletes in selected sports, physical education 
teachers, and military recruits. This finding is not surprising given the nature of extreme haunts and what attendees 
experience. Furthermore, in focusing specifically on scores for Thrill and Adventure Seeking (TAS) they were 
relatively normal among haunted house attendees when compared to those same groups (Norwegian elite and team 
athletes in selected sports, physical education teachers, and military recruits). This finding is also not surprising given 
that individuals who attend haunted houses are more likely to be individuals whose scores would fall within normative 
ranges. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 
 The current research has a variety of limitations that likely played a role in shaping the data. First, a retention 
interval of 45 (Experiment 1) or 30 (Experiment 2) minutes does not allow for one to distinguish between the effects 
of stress on memory consolidation and those on retrieval performance. As Sauerland et al. (2016) points out, many 
previous eyewitness identification studies have typically taken place within a single session of 1 or 2 hours, which 
may make it difficult to separate the effects of stress on memory consolidation versus those on retrieval performance. 
Thus, a retention interval of 24 hours or longer is more desirable. 
 Second, while used in thousands of studies, Spielberger’s (1983) State Anxiety Inventory (SAI) has been 
criticized for its inability to discriminate between symptoms of anxiety and depression and has been found not to 
assess pure anxiety (Ree et al., 2008). Future research attempting to associate physiological and psychological 
measures should consider a psychological measurement such as the State-Trait Inventory of Cognitive and Somatic 
Anxiety (STICSA; Ree et al., 2008). Overall, the STICSA was designed to improve on the previously discussed 
limitations by separating anxiety into cognitive and somatic symptoms, which is the foundation for Deffenbacher’s 
(1994) catastrophe model of memory performance under anxiety and provides a more accurate assessment of pure 
anxiety. 
 Third, the sample sizes in both experiments were relatively small. This is primarily due to extreme haunts 
only admitting a small number of people per show and the limited window in which data collection was possible. The 
sample sizes for haunted house attendees were expected to be larger; however, scheduling changes and actors 
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unable to work due to an illness resulted in a between-subjects design with fewer participants rather than a within-
subjects design with greater participants. Furthermore, this resulted in an inconsistent target presence, which makes 
comparing identification accuracy between the culprits in Experiment 2 difficult when it comes to the interpretation 
of results. However, issues such as these are one of the many logistical risks associated with field studies. Extreme 
haunts are quite ideal for conducting research examining the effects of stress on eyewitness performance, so future 
research should attempt to utilize specific extreme haunts that run multiple nights. 
 Fourth, the use of Colombina masks in Experiment 1 resulted in masked lineup constructions. The decision 
to construct a six-mask lineup was primarily due to the risk of extreme haunt attendees recognizing the actors 
playing the culprits. While the immersive horror experiences associated with extreme haunts has grown, members 
of the community typically attend new shows often, which runs the risk of attendees encountering the same actor 
in multiple shows, regardless of what company is putting them on. For this reason, a masked lineup construction was 
used in case any of the attendees recognized the actors from a previous extreme haunt. The masks were also useful 
in that they helped control for race. An ideal way in which to combat this issue in future research would be to ensure 
that the actor in the extreme haunt is just beginning their career. 
 Last, in comparing multiple culprits to the extent that this research did, the issue of optimal viewing 
conditions arise in that there exist multiple estimator variables that may have likely influenced the differences in 
eyewitness recall and identification outcome between culprits, such as exposure duration and lighting. This limitation 
is primarily specific to Experiment 2, given that the optimality of viewing conditions is different for the control culprits 
encountered prior to entering the haunted house when compared to the experimental culprit encountered while in 
the haunted house. Future research should ensure that exposure time and lighting are as similar as possible. 
Conclusion 
 The current research showed that there was no catastrophic failure on eyewitness recall or identification 
accuracy. Thus, these data are not consistent with Deffenbacher’s (1994) catastrophe model of memory performance 
under anxiety. While Valentine and Mesout (2009) showed that females reported higher state anxiety and made 
fewer correct identification when compared to males and that participants high in state anxiety recalled fewer correct 
details and made fewer correct identifications than participants low in state anxiety, the current study did not find 
effects consistent with such findings. Overall, the current research shows that stress can have minimal or no effect 
on eyewitness recall or identification accuracy.  
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Appendix A: Demographic Form 
 
Provide answers in the spaces provided. 
 
______  1. What is your age? 
 
______  2. What is your sex: Male, Female, Intersex? 
 
______  3. Do you require prescription glasses or contact lenses: Y or N? 
______  3. If yes, are you currently wearing prescription glasses or contact lenses: Y or N? 
 
______ 4. Have you consumed any alcoholic beverages in the past 3 hours: Y or N? 
 4. If so, please list how many alcoholic beverages you have consumed in the past 3 hours? 
  






Appendix B: Sensation-Seeking Scale (SSS Form V; Zuckerman, 1994) 
Interest and Preference Test 
 
Directions: Each of the items below contains two choices, A and B. Please indicate which of the choices most 
describes your likes or the way you feel. In some cases you may find items in which both choices describe your likes 
or feelings. Please choose the one which better describes your likes or feelings. In some cases you may find items in 
which you do not like either choice. In these cases mark the choice you dislike least. Do not leave any items blank. 
It is important you respond to all items with only one choice, A or B. We are interested only in your likes or feelings, 
not in how others feel about these things or how one is supposed to feel. There are no right or wrong answers as 
in other kinds of tests. Be frank and give your honest appraisal of yourself. 
 
1.  A. I like “wild” uninhibited parties. 
 B. I prefer quiet parties with good conversation. 
2.  A. There are some movies I enjoy seeing a second or even third time. 
 B. I can’t stand watching a movie that I’ve seen before. 
3.  A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber. 
 B. I can’t understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains. 
4.  A. I dislike all body odors. 
 B. I like some of the earthy body smells. 
5.  A. I get bored seeing the same old faces. 
 B. I like the comfortable familiarity of everyday friends. 
6.  A. I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even if it means getting lost. 
 B. I prefer a guide when I am in a place I don’t know well. 
7.  A. I dislike people who do or say things just to shock or upset others. 
 B. When you can predict almost everything a person will do and say he or she must be a bore. 
8. A. I usually don’t enjoy a movie or play where I can predict what will happen in advance. 
 B. I don’t mind watching a movie or play where I can predict what will happen in advance. 
9.  A. I have tried marijuana or would like to. 
 B. I would never smoke marijuana. 
10.  A. I would not like to try any drug which might produce strange and dangerous effects on me. 
 B. I would like to try some of the drugs that produce hallucinations. 
11.  A. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous. 
 B. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening. 
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12.  A. I dislike “swingers” (people who are uninhibited and free about sex). 
 B. I enjoy the company of real “swingers.” 
13. A. I find that stimulants make me uncomfortable. 
 B. I often like to get high (drinking liquor or smoking marijuana). 
14.  A. I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before. 
 B. I order the dishes with which I am familiar so as to avoid disappointment and unpleasantness. 
15.  A. I enjoy looking at home movies, videos, or travel slides. 
 B. Looking at someone’s home movies, videos, or travel slides bores me tremendously. 
16.  A. I would like to take up the sport of water skiing. 
 B. I would not like to take up water skiing. 
17.  A. I would like to try surfboard riding. 
 B. I would not like to try surfboard riding. 
18.  A. I would like to take off on a trip with no preplanned or definite routes, or timetable. 
 B. When I go on a trip I like to plan my route and timetable fairly carefully. 
19.  A. I prefer the “down to earth” kinds of people as friends. 
 B. I would like to make friends in some of the “far-out” groups like artists or “punks.” 
20.  A. I would not like to learn to fly an airplane. 
 B. I would like to learn to fly an airplane. 
21.  A. I prefer the surface of the water to the depths. 
 B. I would like to go scuba diving. 
22.  A. I would like to meet some persons who are homosexual (men or women). 
 B. I stay away from anyone I suspect of being “gay” or “lesbian.” 
23.  A. I would like to try parachute jumping. 
 B. I would never want to try jumping out of a plane, with or without a parachute. 
24.  A. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable. 
 B. I prefer friends who are reliable and predictable. 
25.  A. I am not interested in experience for its own sake. 
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 B. I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations even if they are a little frightening, 
 unconventional, or illegal. 
26.  A. The essence of good art is in its clarity, symmetry of form, and harmony of colors. 
 B. I often find beauty in the “clashing” colors and irregular forms of modern paintings. 
27.  A. I enjoy spending time in the familiar surroundings of home. 
 B. I get very restless if I have to stay around home for any length of time. 
28.  A. I like to dive off the high board. 
 B. I don’t like the feeling I get standing on the high board (or I don’t go near it at all). 
29.  A. I like to date persons who are physically exciting. 
 B. I like to date persons who share my values. 
30.  A. Heavy drinking usually ruins a party because some people get loud and boisterous. 
 B. Keeping the drinks full is the key to a good party. 
31.  A. The worst social sin is to be rude. 
 B. The worst social sin is to be a bore. 
32.  A. A person should have considerable sexual experience before marriage. 
 B. It’s better if two married persons begin their sexual experience with each other. 
33.  A. Even if I had the money, I would not care to associate with flighty rich persons in the “jet set.” 
 B. I could conceive of myself seeking pleasures around the world with the “jet set.” 
34.  A. I like people who are sharp and witty even if they do sometimes insult others. 
 B. I dislike people who have their fun at the expense of hurting the feelings of others. 
35.  A. There is altogether too much portrayal of sex in movies. 
 B. I enjoy watching many of the “sexy” scenes in movies. 
36.  A. I feel best after taking a couple of drinks. 
 B. Something is wrong with people who need liquor to feel good. 
37.  A. People should dress according to some standard of taste, neatness, and style. 
 B. People should dress in individual ways even if the effects are sometimes strange. 
38.  A. Sailing long distances in small sailing crafts is foolhardy. 
 B. I would like to sail a long distance in a small but seaworthy sailing craft. 
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39.  A. I have no patience with dull or boring persons. 
 B. I find something interesting in almost every person I talk to. 
40.  A. Skiing down a high mountain slope is a good way to end up on crutches. 
 B. I think I would enjoy the sensations of skiing very fast down a high mountain slope. 
END OF TEST  
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Appendix C: Thrill and Adventure Seeking (TAS) Subscale (Zuckerman, 1994) 
Interest and Preference Test 
 
Directions: Each of the items below contains two choices, A and B. Please indicate which of the choices most 
describes your likes or the way you feel. In some cases you may find items in which both choices describe your likes 
or feelings. Please choose the one which better describes your likes or feelings. In some cases you may find items in 
which you do not like either choice. In these cases mark the choice you dislike least. Do not leave any items blank. 
It is important you respond to all items with only one choice, A or B. We are interested only in your likes or feelings, 
not in how others feel about these things or how one is supposed to feel. There are no right or wrong answers as 
in other kinds of tests. Be frank and give your honest appraisal of yourself. 
 
1.  A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber. 
 B. I can’t understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains. 
2.  A. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous. 
 B. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening. 
3.  A. I would like to take up the sport of water skiing. 
 B. I would not like to take up water skiing. 
4.  A. I would like to try surfboard riding. 
 B. I would not like to try surfboard riding. 
5.  A. I would not like to learn to fly an airplane. 
 B. I would like to learn to fly an airplane. 
6.  A. I prefer the surface of the water to the depths. 
 B. I would like to go scuba diving. 
7.  A. I would like to try parachute jumping. 
 B. I would never want to try jumping out of a plane, with or without a parachute. 
8.  A. I like to dive off the high board. 
 B. I don’t like the feeling I get standing on the high board (or I don’t go near it at all). 
9.  A. Sailing long distances in small sailing crafts is foolhardy. 
 B. I would like to sail a long distance in a small but seaworthy sailing craft. 
10.  A. Skiing down a high mountain slope is a good way to end up on crutches. 
 B. I think I would enjoy the sensations of skiing very fast down a high mountain slope. 
END OF TEST   
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Appendix D: Free Recall 
Instructions: In your own words please describe what you remember about the [situation or actor] you 




Appendix E: Cued Recall 
Instructions: Please answer each question as best as you can. Below are questions regarding the actor who you 
encountered outside the haunted house before entering and who gave you instructions. Please include details 
that you only remember and do not guess at any details you do not remember. 
 
What was the actor’s sex? 
 
 
What was the actor’s age? 
 
 
What was the actor’s weight? 
 
 
What was the actor’s height? 
 
 
What color eyes did the actor have? 
 
 
What color hair did the actor have? 
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Should there be any change to the protocol, it will be necessary to submit a Modification Form through ORI - 
Human Subjects. No changes may be made to the existing protocol until modifications have been approved. 
 
ALL UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS involving risk to subjects or others and SERIOUS and UNEXPECTED adverse 
events must be reported promptly to this office. Please use the appropriate reporting forms for this procedure. 
 
All FDA and sponsor reporting requirements should also be followed. 
 
All NONCOMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this protocol must be reported promptly to this office. 
 
If you have questions, please contact the Office of Research Integrity - Human Subjects at IRB@unlv.edu or call 702- 895-







Appendix G: Informed Consent 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT  
Department of Psychology 
  
  
TITLE OF STUDY: Eyewitness identification: Effects of stress in extreme haunts 
INVESTIGATOR(S): David Copeland, PhD and William Ridgway, MA 
For questions or concerns about the study, you may contact Dr. David Copeland at 702-895-5904.   
 
For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, any complaints or comments regarding the manner in 
which the study is being conducted, contact the UNLV Office of Research Integrity – Human Subjects at 




Purpose of the Study 
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to examine how individuals 
physiologically perform in an exciting scenario such as a haunted house and how they view their experiences. 
 
Participants 
You are being asked to participate in the study because you fit this criterion: Adult aged 18 years or older. 
 
Procedures  
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to do the following: Wear a heart rate monitor 10 
minutes prior to entering the haunted house, as well as during your time spent inside the haunted house. Additionally, 
you will be asked to answer questions relating to your experience of the haunted house. There will be a total of 45 
questions; 40 questions with a scaled (1-4) response questions that address how you felt in the haunted house, and 
5 questions that are cued and free response questions that address your perspective on the series of events that 
took place during your haunted house experience.  
 
Benefits of Participation  
There may not be direct benefits to you as a participant in this study. However, we hope to learn more about how 
individuals perform in exciting situations such as a haunted house, as well as how they perceive their experiences. 
 
Risks of Participation  
There are risks involved in all research studies, but the potential risks in this study are only minimal risk to those 
involved. These risks are considered minimal in that its extent is no greater than one would experience in activities 
one voluntarily chooses to do in daily life. If at any point in the study you wish to remove yourself from participation, 
you are free to withdraw from the study. 
 
Cost /Compensation  
There may not be financial cost to you to participate in this study. The study will take approximately 60 minutes of 
your time and you can learn about how psychological research studies are conducted. 







All information gathered in this study will be kept confidential and any information gathered will only be identifiable 
by a code number. No reference will be made in written or oral materials that could link you to this study. All 
records will be stored in a locked facility at UNLV for 3 years after completion of the study. After the storage time 
the information gathered will be deleted.  
 
Voluntary Participation  
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study altogether, or at any time 
during this study. You may withdraw at any time without penalty and without prejudice. You are welcome to ask 
questions about this study at the beginning or any time during the research study. 
 
Participant Consent:  
I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study. I have been able to ask questions about the 





             
Signature of Participant                                              Date  
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